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Abstract

This dissertation is structured in the form of two empirical essays, each
investigating one type of irrational decision caused by mental accounting. The first essay,
titled “Managing the Cost of Multiple Debt Accounts: A Behavioral Perspective”,
explores why many people pay off credit cards’ with the lowest rate first when rationally
speaking they should repay the debt with the highest rate most quickly. This essay
suggests that irrationality emerges when people seek to close ‘mental accounts’
associated with their credit cards and reduce the total number of outstanding loans rather
than decrease the amount of total debt among all credit cards. Consumers want to be debt
free. If they can get rid of debt, on even one credit card, they feel a sense of
accomplishment which psychologically helps them manage remainder of their debt
better. The second essay, titled “Saving by Overspending”, explores consumers’ overexpenditure and indulgent consumption when they make prepayments in the form of
time, effort, or money toward a consumption goal. This essay proposes that people
subconsciously try to get their prepayments’ worth, but in fact they may be spending their
money irrationally. In addition, contrary to common knowledge, this essay suggests that
when a prepayment is unanticipated, the loss of self-control is often more prominent
when prepayments are made with behavioral resources (e.g., time or effort) than
equivalent monetary resources.
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Essay 1:
Managing the Cost of Multiple Debt Accounts: A Behavioral Perspective

1.1 Overview

This essay, employing three experiments, suggests that customers who own
multiple credit cards may irrationally pay off the debt with the lowest interest first instead
of paying off the debt with the highest interest. The first experiment confirms that
individuals have a tendency to allocate their income toward the debt with the smallest
balance and the lowest APR when they can pay off the entire or a major portion of the
balance. The second experiment determines that debt repayment decisions are influenced
by the nature of the debt (hedonic vs. utilitarian) and the timing of consumption benefits
(past vs. future). That is, when consumption benefits occurred in the past (future),
individuals were more willing to pay off the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest
APR when it was associated with hedonic (utilitarian) rather than utilitarian (hedonic)
consumption. Finally, our final experiment reveals that debtors tend to pay their debt
more rationally when the number of debt accounts is increased or savings as opposed to
other types of income such as windfall or reward-based are used toward the debt
payment. Individuals’ motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts is shown to be
the underlying mechanism for our findings.
1

1.2 Introduction

Credit cards play an important role in consumer finances, especially in the current
economic downturn where most customers have liquidity constraints. The convenience of
use and the instant access to money are two reasons why a credit card is an attractive
method of payment for both offline (e.g., in store) and e-commerce transactions. As the
number of credit card transactions has radically increased in recent years, so has the
credit card debt of consumers. Many consumers struggle to fully pay off their credit card
balances each month and they revolve debt (e.g., the growth of debt when consumers’
rate of repayment slows). Recent credit card statistics report that 56% of the United
States population carries a balance equal to $801 billion (Federal Reserve Report, 2012).
The debt repayment decision becomes even more complex when consumers own multiple
credit cards. For instance, industry reports indicate that American customers, on average,
have five credit cards and the average balance per open credit card is $1,157 (Credit Card
Report, 2012).
Classic principles of economics suggest that consumers are rational and they
should repay the debt with the highest rate most quickly. However, evidence from the
behavioral finance literature indicates that individuals do not always employ normative
principles in debt management (Navarro-Martinez, Salisbury, Lemon, Stewart, Matthews,
and Harris, 2011; Amar, Ariely, Ayal, Cryder, and Rick, 2011). For instance, NavarroMartinez et al. (2011) find that presenting the minimum required payment information
and disclosing supplemental debt information have no significant impact on debt
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repayment decisions. Amar et al. (2011) indicate that individuals often make suboptimal
financial decision in the form of debt account aversion. That is, debtors manage a debt
portfolio by allocating most of their budget toward their small debt balances. When
individuals were not able to pay off their smallest balance, however, their attention was
drawn more to the financial costs of their debt accounts.
This paper extends the stream of research on the psychology of debt payment by
investigating how people manage multiple credit card debt and how they prioritize their
debt repayment. In particular, we demonstrate that people under certain circumstances
may mismanage their credit card debt, ultimately delaying their ability to become debt
free. Loan borrowers’ motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts underlies the
intention to pay off the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR (i.e., the least
expensive loan). We propose that the negative thoughts of payment caused by the
segregation of debt (e.g., segregated losses) create a psychological burden that eventually
leads borrowers toward reducing the number of debt accounts, regardless of their interest
rates (APR). In the case of multiple debt accounts, when the complexity of debt is
reduced, individuals perceive a sense of psychological progress (Amar et al., 2011). The
perception of progress toward a goal has been shown to work as a self-imposed
psychological reward (Kivetz et al., 2006) and this may help borrowers to better deal with
the remainder of their debt accounts.
We suggest that the complexity of debt management in the case of multiple credit
cards may cause debtors to behave irrationally by paying off the smallest debt with the
lowest APR first. For example, a person with a $300 loan with a 6% interest rate and a
$3,000 loan with 12% interest may decide to pay off the $300 loan with their first
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paycheck, rather than the $3,000 loan. Therefore, customers with multiple credit card
debts tend to reduce the number of debt accounts rather than to decrease the total cost of
debt across all accounts. This notion is supported by research that finds that consumers
discount future interests rates (Stango and Zinman, 2009) and underestimate the
exponential growth of interest compounding (McKenzie and Liersch, 2011), especially
when they are not obligated to pay off their debt within a certain period. Although
eliminating one of the debt accounts may give consumers an impression of progress
toward the end goal (e.g., becoming debt free) and may offer short-term psychological
benefits, this behavior costs borrowers in the long run by delaying their ability to become
debt free.
In addition, this paper examines the role of additional factors such as the purpose
of the debt (e.g., whether the loan is used for hedonic or utilitarian consumption), the
timing of the debt benefits (e.g., whether the benefits of the loan are realized in the past
or future), the number of credit cards, and the source of income used to pay off the debt
(e.g., savings, reward-based, or windfall) on credit card debt management. The topic of
the current research is relevant not only to consumer researchers and policy makers trying
to help consumers repay debt more efficiently, but to lenders as well, as they assess the
average time for their loans to be repaid based on the credit portfolios of borrowers.
We begin this paper with a review of the relevant literature and use this
information to formulate our hypotheses. Then, we report three experiments that examine
these hypotheses. Finally, we conclude with a general discussion of the results and
various theoretical, public policy, and managerial implications of our findings.

4

1.3 Literature Review

Mental accounting is a type of framing in which individuals form psychological
accounts for the costs and benefits associated with their choices (Thaler, 1980). These
accounts will remain open until a consumer has completed a transaction and obtained the
consumption benefits (Thaler, 1985). Mental accounting helps people monitor their
financial activities and regulate their consumption (Read, Loewenstein, and
Kalyanaraman, 1999). Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) express the reciprocal interaction
between the pleasure of consumption and the pain of payment (also known as
“coupling”). Depending upon whether the positive utility of consumption surpasses the
negative utility of payment, a consumer may evaluate the overall experience as pleasure
(e.g., labeled “black”) or pain (e.g., labeled “red”).
When people make a payment, they feel the pain of the incurred cost that may
mitigate the positive feelings associated with future consumption. Similarly, the pleasure
derived from consumption may be reduced when negative thoughts of the future payment
are primed (Gourville and Soman, 1998; Siemens, 2007). “Sunk cost effect” is defined as
individuals’ commitment to attain a planned decision when they have already devoted
resources to its attainment (Thaler, 1985). When payment becomes decoupled from
consumption benefits, the sunk cost effect of payment is reduced (Soman and Gourville,
2001). There are two ways that temporal separation (i.e., decoupling) of transaction costs
and benefits may occur. First, it is possible that an individual pays for an item temporally
prior to the consumption. Gourville and Soman (1998) propose that when a payment
precedes benefits in a transaction, individuals pay more attention to the sunk costs.
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However, this sunk cost effect disappears as time passes. The diminishing sunk cost
effect over time is referred to as “payment depreciation.” Gourville and Soman (1998)
found that people who paid for an annual gym membership in advance were less likely to
use the gym facilities with the passage of time compared to those who paid monthly gym
memberships.
Additionally, it is likely that a reverse process to payment depreciation may take
place in which consumption benefits occur before investment costs. Gourville and Soman
(1998) refer to this process as “benefit depreciation.” In this case, a consumer uses the
product before making the payment. They propose that the hedonic impact of the benefit
depreciates over time such that the future payment feels more like a pure loss. The use of
credit cards is one of the prevalent methods for the decoupling of consumption benefits
from the disutility of payment. This happens as consumers typically experience the
consumption benefits prior to the billing cycle.

1.4 The Smallest Balance with the Lowest APR is Paid First

A majority of credit card users own multiple credit cards (Rysman, 2007) and
almost half of them are mired in credit card debt (Bertaut, Haliassos, and Reiter, 2009).
Evidence from the behavioral finance literature finds that individuals often deviate from
normative principles in debt management and behave irrationally (Navarro-Martinez et
al., 2011; Stango and Zinman, 2009). This paper proposes that borrowers with multiple
credit card debt tend to simplify their debt management task by reducing the total number
of credit cards instead of focusing on the goal of reducing the total cost of their debt (i.e.,
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paying the debt with the highest APR first). For example, a person with a $500 debt and
10% APR and a $1,000 debt with a 15% APR may decide to pay off the $500 loan (i.e.
the least expensive debt to keep) first within the parameters of a constrained budget to
eliminate one of the debt accounts. This decision provides debtors a feeling of
accomplishment and positive progress toward total debt repayment.
Several theories could explain this irrational behavior in multiple credit cards debt
management. First, payment is painful, especially when it is decoupled from consumption
(Thaler, 1985; Gourville and Soman, 1998). When a consumer uses a credit card, the
consumption benefits are typically decoupled from the cost of the payment as the
consumption is experienced before the payment (Gourville and Soman, 1998). Therefore,
credit card debt, which is also referred to as debt account, represents a potential loss at
the time of payment because most of the benefits are depreciated in the past (Soman,
2001). When the number of debt accounts increases, the cost of debt becomes more
salient as the disutility of segregated losses exceeds the disutility of aggregated losses
(Kim, 2006; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Renewable resources theory (Linville and
Fischer, 1991) posits that individuals have limited, but naturally renewable, loss buffering
resources that are used to attenuate the aversive impact of negative events. When credit
card users encounter multiple losses at the same time, the psychological burden of
handling multiple losses requires borrowers to use a loss buffering (e.g., coping)
mechanism to offset some of the pain associated with the immediate perceived losses
(Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister, 2001). Debt borrowers can partially discount the
negative utility of the total debt by adding a psychological gain to it. In the case of
multiple revolving accounts, reducing the debt on one of the revolving credit cards can
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serve as a self-imposed psychological reward. Brenner, Rottenstreich, Sood, and Bilgin
(2007) define possession loss aversion and assert that parting with a negative possession
(i.e., an undesirable item such as debt) is a positive change and evokes pleasure. Hence, it
is more desirable for people to change their status quo (e.g., eliminate one of the
revolving balances) to experience the exaggerated “relief” from getting rid of an
undesirable possession (i.e., a self-imposed reward system).
Additionally, people tend to divide an ongoing goal into many constituent subgoals to monitor their actual actions (Fishbach and Shah, 2006). Particularly, when a
superordinate goal is perceived to be difficult, people often try to attain the intended task
by splitting it into smaller, more manageable parts (Newell and Simon, 1972). For
example, people who want to stay in shape may pursue this goal via eating healthy,
dieting, and exercising. Research indicates that the focus on sub-goal attainment inhibits
the relationship between sub-goals and a superordinate goal. The reason is that sub-goal
attainment creates a sense of accomplishment that justifies temporary disengagement
from the superordinate goal (Fishbach and Dhar, 2005). Moreover, actions that are
scheduled in the distant future are represented in more abstract terms, whereas decisions
made for the proximal future are represented in more concrete forms (Trope and
Liberman, 2003). The pursuit of sub-goals in the distant future is like focusing on a
commitment to a superordinate goal and the pursuit of sub-goals in the proximal future is
akin to focusing on sub-goal attainment (Fishbach and Shah, 2006). In the context of
multiple credit cards debt management, a superordinate goal is to become completely
debt free, while a sub-goal is to pay each credit card debt separately. Since borrowers
owe many credit cards and they have limited financial resources, paying off multiple
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debts is perceived to be difficult. Hence, borrowers may decide to break the intended task
into smaller, more manageable sub-goals, each focused on paying off an individual debt.
Meanwhile, debt revolvers visualize closing their mental accounts (e.g., being debt free)
in the distant future, but closing mental accounts linked to a credit card debt in the
proximal future. Therefore, they pursue this sub-goal because it is more achievable and
justifiable in the short run, but it diminishes their motivation to attain their superordinate
goal, which is to become debt free (Amir and Ariely, 2008; Fishbach and Shah, 2006).
Finally, consumers regularly calculate their relative distance to a goal (Simonson
and Tversky, 1992) and compare it with a certain criterion (e.g., paying off the debt).
When their rate of progress satisfies this criterion, they experience positive affects
(Carver and Scheier, 1990). The goal-gradient hypothesis denotes the actual or the
illusion of progress toward a goal increases effort acceleration. It proposes that customers
accelerate and persist in their efforts as they approach a program’s reward requirement
(Kivetz et al., 2006). For instance, customers who had a café reward program increased
their coffee purchases as they progressed toward earning a free coffee. When facing
multiple debts on various credit cards, consumers may measure their distance to their
ultimate goal and, subsequently, repay their debt in a manner that gives them an
impression of progress toward the desired goal. Paying off individual loans rather than
managing the overall deb account could evoke the perception of progress as it is easier to
attain a smaller goal than a big goal.
Based upon the aforementioned theories, this research proposes that credit card
users mitigate the negative thoughts of debt payments by reducing the number of their
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credit cards. This results in paying off the smallest balance with the lowest APR and runs
counter to rational considerations.

H1: People allocate most of their budget toward the debt with the smaller
balance and the lower APR when their budget meets (or is considerably
close to) the smaller balance.

1.5 Debt Repayment: The Timing and the Nature of Debt

Research suggests that people are debt averse and they want to pay off debt that
does not provide any further benefits (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998). Gourville and
Soman (1998) refer to this process as “benefit depreciation.” That is, when the
consumption benefit depreciates over time, payment feels more like a pure loss. When
people feel there is no future consumption benefits associated with a product acquired
with a loan, they do not want to deal with the hassle of future payments. Hence, a
consumer’s payment decision will depend upon the timing of future benefits. If
consumers have loans for which the benefits have already been realized, they tend to pay
them off with high priority (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998).
In addition to the timing of the debt, the purpose of the debt may also influence
the way people pay off their debt. Loans may be borrowed for either utilitarian or hedonic
purposes. Utilitarian consumption provides consumers with functional benefits that are
necessary and useful, whereas hedonic consumption is associated with fun and pleasure
(Mishra and Mishra, 2011). Kivetz and Simonson (2002) demonstrate that the pain of
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payment is more pronounced for hedonic consumption (e.g., vacation) than for utilitarian
consumption (e.g., insurance) because, by definition, hedonic consumption is not
essential and is more difficult to justify. Also, hedonic consumption is considered
wasteful and may evoke guilt (Chen, Kalra, and Sun, 2009). Research shows that people
quickly adapt to enjoyable consumption (e.g., consuming one’s preferred ice cream)
because hedonic experiences depreciate more quickly than utilitarian experiences
(Kahneman and Snell, 1990;Wang, Novemsky, and Dhar, 2009). Therefore, this paper
hypothesizes that people are more willing to pay off debt associated with hedonic
consumption than utilitarian consumption when the consumption benefits have been
realized in the past.

H2a: People allocate most of their budget toward the debt with the
smaller balance when it is associated with past hedonic consumption than
when it is associated with past utilitarian consumption.

Conversely, thinking about future hedonic consumption is more enjoyable than
utilitarian consumption (Nowlis, Mandel, and McCabe, 2004). Due to the emotional
attachment to hedonic consumption, people anticipate more enjoyment and satisfaction
from using hedonic rather than utilitarian products in the future (Shiv and Huber, 2000).
Similarly, Caplin and Leahy (2001) indicated that the expectation from future hedonic
consumption has an additional positive impact on the overall evaluation of consumption.
Loewenstein (1987) finds that people are willing to pay a greater amount of money if
they receive a kiss from a movie star three days in the future instead of immediately. In
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another study, Nowlis et al. (2004) report that people who wait to consume a chocolate
bar for an unknown period of time enjoy the consumption more than people who
consume it immediately. Since the anticipation of hedonic consumption in the future
gives people pleasure, they will be reluctant to ruin their mood by making a payment.
Soman and Gourville (2001) indicate that, ideally, consumption should be decoupled
from payment so that it does not evoke negative feelings about the payment. Hence, this
paper proposes that people are more willing to pay off debt associated with utilitarian
consumption rather than hedonic consumption when the consumption benefits are
expected in the future.

H2b: People allocate most of their budget toward the debt with the
smaller balance when it is associated with future utilitarian consumption
than when it is associated with future hedonic consumption.

1.6 Does the Number of Credit Cards Matter?

The value function in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) is defined
as deviation from a reference point and is generally steeper in the loss domain than in the
gain domain. This theory implies that the overall subjective utility from segregated gains
is less than one aggregated gain, whereas the overall subjective disutility from segregated
losses is more than one aggregated loss (Hsee, Hastie, and Chen, 2008). Therefore,
prospect theory suggests that consumers would be motivated to reduce the number of
debt accounts immediately to reduce the total cost of mental accounting. This theory also
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reports that the value function in the domain of losses is steepest near zero and gradually
becomes flatter when the number of losses increases (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). For
example, the marginal utility (e.g., the relative reduction in the pain of payment) gained
from reducing the number of debt accounts from two to one is significantly more than
reducing the number of segregated debts from five to four. In other words, when the
number of mental accounts increases, closing one of them would not give rise to enough
noticeable psychological gain (e.g., positive emotions evoked from a reduction in the
pain of total loss) for people to use it as a loss buffering mechanism (Linville and Fischer,
1991). Accordingly, this paper predicts that people will be more likely to pay debt in
accordance with their APR when the number of debt accounts significantly grows. It is
important to note that we arbitrarily chose the number of debt accounts to increase to five
as credit reports show that American consumers, on average, own five credit cards
(Credit Card Report, 2012).

H3: People who own two debt accounts are more likely to allocate most of
their budget toward the debt with the smaller balance than people who
have five debt accounts.

1.7 Debt Management and the Source of Income

Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) suggests that people are more
sensitive to losses than to corresponding gains relative to their current reference point.
That is, for the equivalent gain and loss, the loss will be accentuated relative to the

13

corresponding gain. When payment is loosely decoupled from consumption, it is a
hedonic loss (Prelec and Lowenstein, 1998) such that people feel pain when paying.
Research indicates that the “pain of payment” is caused by the nature of the payment.
Prelec and Lowenstein (1998) indicate that paying in cash elicits greater pain of payment
than paying by other modes of payment. Similarly, Soman (2001) finds that the pain of
payment is immediate in the case of cash payments, whereas the pain is attenuated in the
case of credit card payments.
Paying with windfall income reduces the pain of payment (Soman and Cheema,
2001). Windfall money is unexpected and thus, it is unbudgeted income. Parting with a
resource that was earned with effort is more painful than windfall money that is received
effortlessly. People also feel more ownership of the former resource than the latter
(Soman, 2001). Windfall money is typically spent more frivolously than normal income
(Thaler, 1985). Windfall money also evokes positive feelings and promotes selfgratification (Levav and McGraw, 2009). O’Curry and Strahilevitz (2001) demonstrate
that people are more willing to buy hedonic products with a windfall gain than with
ordinary income.
Accordingly, this paper proposes that people will pay their debt more rationally
when they use effortful money rather than windfall money. That is, people are more
likely to pay off the debt with the highest APR when they spend from their savings than
when their income source is windfall money. Conversely, people are more inclined to pay
off the smallest debt with the lowest APR when they spend their windfall money as
opposed to their savings. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is set forth:
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H4a: People who use windfall money are more likely to allocate most of
their budget toward the debt with the smaller balance than people who use
the equivalent amount of money from their savings.

Effort is often not available in a monetary format; however, people may convert it
into a task that can be rewarded financially and psychologically in the future. For
instance, a loyalty program allows people to earn reward points toward their future
purchases. These reward points have both financial (e.g., when they are redeemed) and
psychological (e.g., status) meanings to consumers (Hsee, Yu, and Zhang, 2003).
Research indicates that “sunk cost effect” appear for the effort people invest into loyalty
programs (Kivetz and Simonson, 2002), but it is of a weaker magnitude when compared
to monetary investments (Soman, 2001). The reason is that individuals either fail to
calculate the opportunity costs of effort when unstated (Neumann and Friedman, 1980) or
they discount it when prompted (Hoskin, 1983). When people invest non-monetary
resources, they notice the pain of investment, but they are less sensitive to their loss as
compared to a monetary investment (Monga and Saini, 2009). In other words, parting
with non-monetary income will be less painful than spending money that was earned with
hardship. Kivetz et al. (2006) find that people feel they are entitled to indulge when they
use their loyalty program points. When the disutility of payment appears less evidently,
people will be more likely to spend their reward points irrespective of the true cost of the
debt. Hence, this paper proposes that people are more likely to pay off the smallest debt
with the lowest APR when the income source is reward points rather than money from
their savings.
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H4b: People who use reward-based money are more likely to allocate
most of their budget toward the debt with the smaller balance than people
who use the equivalent amount of money from their savings.

1.8 Why Does This Effect Occur?

Past research findings suggest that people account for their costs and seek benefits
to close their mental accounts. Heath and Soll (1996) indicate that individuals track the
costs of their expenses and assign those costs to the relevant mental account. By doing so,
a consumer may evaluate the overall experience as gain or loss depending upon whether
the positive utility of consumption surpasses the negative utility of financial payment
(Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998). Soman (2001) finds that people actively track the cost of
their mental accounts and depending upon the nature of the cost (e.g., time vs. money),
they demonstrate different sunk cost effects. Similarly, Soster, Monga, and Bearden
(2010) confirm that mental cost tracking mediates the likelihood to seek benefits after a
payment.
The notion of tracking the cost of multiple debt accounts, each being treated as a
segregated loss, creates a cognitive and emotional burden for individuals (Soman, 2001).
This is because the segregation of losses makes each loss appear independently and more
saliently (Cheema and Soman, 2008). Dealing with segregated losses is distressing and
may evoke strong negative emotions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The renewable
resource model (Linville and Fischer, 1991) asserts that individuals have limited, but
renewable, loss buffering resources that are used to attenuate the aversive impacts of
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negative events. When people monitor the cost of multiple debt accounts simultaneously,
their loss buffering resources will be depleted immediately. Therefore, people need to
substitute a coping mechanism to offset some of the costs associated with their total debt
accounts. One strategy is to change the structure of segregated losses and eliminate one
(or more) of the losses from the set. Brenner et al. (2007) show that people, arbitrarily,
part with a loss so that they can keep their emotions under control. If borrowers know
that their available budget can be used toward reducing (or eliminating) the total cost of
the mental account, they will decide to close one of the mental accounts to attenuate the
aversive impact of multiple losses. Therefore, we propose that individuals’ motivation to
reduce the number of debt accounts is the underlying rationale that explains why credit
card users pay off their debt irrationally.

H5: The interaction between the number of credit cards and the type of
income on individuals’ tendency to allocate their budget toward the
smallest debt is fully mediated by their motivation to reduce the number of
debt accounts.

1.9 Overview of the Studies

The core research question in this paper is whether people manage their debt
rationally when they own multiple credit cards. Our research hypothesizes that people
have a tendency to reduce the number of debt accounts rather than the total cost of debt.
This is demonstrated by paying off the loan with the lowest balance, regardless of the
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interest rate. In addition, we investigate how various factors, such as the nature of income
(e.g., savings vs. reward-based vs. windfall), number of credit cards, type of debt (e.g.,
hedonic vs. utilitarian), and timing of loan benefits (e.g., past vs. future), may moderate
the debt management anomaly. Three experiments are designed to examine these
predictions. Experiment 1 uses a scenario-based study to illustrate the main effect (H1).
Subjects read a scenario about owning two credit cards from different financial
institutions. One of the credit cards has a debt equal to $600 with a 12% (18%) APR,
while the other card has a debt equal to $1,200 with an 18% (12%) APR. Participants are
informed that they have a balance of $600 ($400 or $200) in their savings account after
paying for their other monthly expenses. Then, they are told they must use their savings
to pay off part of their debt. Participants are given the freedom to allocate their money
toward one or both of their debt account(s).
The second experiment explores how the debt management is influenced by the
joint effect of the nature (e.g., hedonic vs. utilitarian) and the timing of debt benefits (e.g.,
past vs. future). Akin to the first experiment, participants are told that they own two credit
cards from two different financial institutions. However, unlike the first experiment, we
did not manipulate the interest rate of the cards as the purpose of this study was to
investigate how the debt management anomaly could be moderated. For all condition, the
first credit card has a debt equal to $600 with 12% APR, while the second card has a debt
equal to $1,200 with 18% APR. We propose that when the consumption for which the
debt was incurred has been satisfied, people are more willing to pay off the smaller
balance associated with hedonic consumption than utilitarian consumption (H2a).
Conversely, when consumption benefits are expected in the future, borrowers are more
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willing to pay off debt associated with utilitarian consumption than debt associated with
hedonic consumption (H2b).
The third experiment examines whether people’s debt repayment decision is
conditioned on the number of credit cards and the nature of allocated income. In
particular, we compare the likelihood of paying off the smallest debt ($600) with the
lowest interest rate (12%) by varying the number of credit cards individuals own (two vs.
five) and the nature of income that individuals allocate toward debt payment (savings vs.
windfall vs. frequent flyer). We hypothesize that people’s irrational debt payment is
attenuated when the number of credit cards increases (H3) and when individuals use their
hard earned savings compared to either frequent flyer (H4a) or windfall money (H4b).
We suggest that the motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts underlies these
effects (H5). This mediating process reveals that people actively monitor the cost of
multiple debt accounts and plan to close one of the mental accounts to sufficiently
progress toward their end goal of becoming debt free.

1.10 Experiment 1

This experiment tests the prediction that people are debt averse and they exhibit
this tendency by reducing the number of debt accounts. This behavior is financially
irrational when the smallest debt has the lowest interest rate because individuals neglect
the opportunity cost of their income and they underestimate the financial cost of their
total debt. Irrespective of the manipulation of the interest rates between credit cards, we
expect subjects to overwhelmingly allocate their budget toward the smallest credit card
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debt when they intend to pay the entire (i.e., actual progress) or a relatively major portion
of the balance of the smallest debt (i.e., illusion of progress). However, this tendency
diminishes when the budget covers a relatively minor portion of the balance of the
smallest debt (i.e., no progress).

1.10.1 Pretest. This experiment involved scenarios where we manipulated the
perception of debt payment fulfillment. The perception of actual progress toward the debt
payment was created by informing subjects that they have a total of $600 in their savings
account to allocate to their existing debt. Since the balance of one of the credit cards was
$600 across all conditions, the presented budget matched the lowest debt amount and
participants were able to completely pay off (close) one of the debt accounts if they
desired to do so. It should be noted that any other budget that exceeds $600 should
conceptually create the same perception of actual progress toward the sub-goal, but we
conservatively chose an income that matched, not exceeded, the smallest debt balance.
We conducted a pretest among a group of undergraduate students (n=22) to
identify the minimum income that induced the illusion of progress and the maximum
income that created the perception of no progress toward the debt payment. We used the
same credit card scenario from the main study in that subjects were told that they owned
two credit cards from different, but equal, financial institutions. The first credit card
carried a debt equal to $600 with 12% APR and the second credit card carried $1,200 in
debt with 18% APR. Respondents imagined that they wanted to pay the smallest debt
equal to $600, but they had less than $600 in their savings account. Then, they were
presented with two questions with sliding scales, each ranging from $0 to $599. The

20

questions were: “By moving the slider to the left or right, please indicate the minimum
[maximum] income that when used entirely would [not] give you the impression of
progress toward the credit card debt payment”. We counterbalanced the order of these
questions to eliminate any order bias. Our results indicated that, on average, people with
a minimum of $428.56 (SD=61.44) in their savings account formed an impression of
progress, whereas individuals with a maximum of $188.33 (SD=49.61) perceived no
progress toward debt management. Using the one sample t-test, we compared these
values to $400 and $200 correspondingly and they were not significantly different (t’s<1,
p>.05). Thus, in the main experiment, we used $400 in the savings account to manipulate
the illusion of progress and $200 in the savings account to manipulate the illusion of no
progress toward debt payment.

1.10.2 Design, participants, and procedure. This experiment is a 2 (smallest
debt APR: 12% vs. 18%) x 3 (budget limit: $600 vs. $400 vs. $200) between subjects
factorial design. Two hundred forty-six undergraduate students were recruited from a
public, southern university in the United States to participate in this experiment in
exchange for partial course credit (Mage=22.36 years, SD=5.14; males=119 and
females=125). A total of five individuals were later excluded from the analyses as they
either failed the manipulation check or they did not finish the survey completely. Subjects
completed an online survey and were randomly assigned to the one of the six possible
conditions. The first two pages of the study were common to all conditions. They
described the purpose of the study and asked for consent to participate. The scenario
asked participants to imagine that they had two credit cards from different financial
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institutions, M and S. Depending upon the experimental condition, subjects were
informed that they had a debt equal to $600 with a 12% (18%) APR on credit card M and
a debt equal to $1,200 with an 18% (12%) APR on credit card S. We manipulated the
interest rates assigned to the credit cards such that half of subjects associated the smallest
debt with the highest APR, whereas another half associated it with the lowest APR.
Participants were also informed that they had a balance of ($600 or$400 or$200) in their
savings account after paying for all their expenses. Then, they were asked to use their
savings to pay off their existing debt the way they preferred. The aim was to see how
participants allocated their income between two credit cards. The scenario for the
smallest debt with the lowest APR is presented below. Please note that words in the
brackets denote the conditions to which participants were randomly assigned.

“Imagine that you have recently graduated and are in a new job making
an after-tax salary of $3,600 per month. You are keen to reduce the debt
you incurred while in college, and after paying for rent, groceries,
utilities, and entertainment, you have a balance of $600 [$400/$200].
Currently, you have two credit cards, say, M and S. Credit card M has a
debt of $600 @ 12% [18%] APR and credit card S has a debt of $1,200 @
18% [12%] APR. Assume that you have paid the minimum balance of
each credit card and you want to use $600 [$400/$200] from savings to
pay down your debt.
Please indicate how you would use the budget to reduce your existing
debt. You may choose to allocate the budget to one of the accounts or
spread your money across both accounts.”

In the last page of the survey, we asked participants to answer manipulation check
questions and to indicate their level of involvement and their overall knowledge of credit
card terms.
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1.10.3 Independent variables.
1.10.3.1 Smallest debt APR. We chose two interest rates of 12% and 18% for
this experiment. We manipulated the order of assignment of these interest rates between
credit cards at two levels. First, we assigned 12% APR to credit card M which had the
smallest balance ($600) and 18% APR to credit card S which had the largest balance
($1200). Additionally, we reversed the order of the APR assignment, meaning that credit
card M with a $600 balance was given 18% APR, while credit card S with $1,200
balance was shown with 12% APR.

1.10.3.2 Income level. The amount of income that participants were allowed
to use to pay down their credit card debt was manipulated at three levels. The first group
was told that they had $600 in their savings account. This income was equal to the debt
balance on credit card M. The second group was given $400 in their savings account to
pay down their debt. Finally, the last group had $200 in their savings account to be used
for debt payment. This income was presented to all participants as the net savings after all
expenses were deducted. We expect the $600 income to create the impression of actual
progress, the $400 income to convey the illusion of progress, and the $200 to be
interpreted as no progress toward debt reduction. These values were chosen based upon
the results of the pretest that we reported earlier.

1.10.4 Dependent variable. The dependent variable is was the proportion of
budget allocated to the smallest balance. We presented a sliding scale next to each credit
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card and asked participants how much of their existing budget they wanted to allocate to
each debt account. Each scale was shown in $20 increments and moving the slider to the
right (left) increased (decreased) the allocated budget to the credit card debt. The system
only allowed subjects to pay down debt across both credit cards up to their given budget.
Next, we divided the amount money that each person allocated to the smallest balance
(i.e., credit card M) by their income to calculate the proportion of budget allocated to the
smallest balance. For example, this proportion for a person with $600 income was .7 if
he/she allocated $420 to credit card M and $180 to credit card S.

1.10.5 Covariates. We measured participants’ overall knowledge of credit card
terms by asking them to rate the following attributes on a 7-point semantic scale (1=one
of the least knowledgeable and 7=one of the most knowledgeable): APR%, minimum
balance, payment due date, credit card limit, and outstanding balance. An average of the
five items was used as a measure of overall credit card knowledge (Cronbach’s
alpha=.86). The level of involvement with the task was also measured by averaging four
7-point semantic differential scales adapted from Wang and Calder (2006). In particular,
we asked participants to indicate whether when they were reading the credit card scenario
“they were very involved,” ”they were very interested,” “they read the information
carefully,” and “they paid a lot of attention.” These items were also found to be highly
reliable (Cronbach’s alpha=.93). Neither the overall knowledge nor the task involvement
revealed significant effect on the dependent variables. Therefore, they were not
controlled in subsequent analyses.
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1.10.6 Results.
1.10.6.1 Manipulation check. We assessed the success of the manipulation of
the independent variables with three questions at the end of the survey. First, we asked
people in a multiple-choice question to select the option that properly indicated the
balance of credit card debt and their pertinent APRs. Consistent with the information
presented in each condition, all but one chose the correct response. Next, we used a
recognition task wherein people indicated the amount of budget that they allocated to the
debt accounts. No respondents failed in this task either. Finally, we asked individuals to
indicate on a 7-point asymmetrical scale to what extent their payment resembled progress
toward being debt free (1=not at all and 7=very much). Overall, individuals who were
assigned to the $600 (M=5.42) and $400 income (M=4.81) perceived greater progress
toward their end goal when compared to the group with the $200 income (M=3.09;
t=4.36, p<.05 and t=2.66, p<.05, correspondingly). No significant difference in the
perception of progress toward the total debt payment goal was observed between the
income levels of $600 and $400 (t=1.62, p>.05). Therefore, a total of 241 responses that
met the above criteria were kept for further analyses.

1.10.6.2 Support for H1. A 2 (smallest debt APR: 12% vs. 18%) x 3 (income
level: $600 vs. $400 vs. $200) ANOVA with the proportion of budget allocated to debt
with the smallest balance as the dependent variable demonstrated significant main effects
of smallest debt APR (F (1,235) =358.63, p<.05) and income level (F (2,235) =125.47,
p<.05). More importantly, however, these main effects were qualified by a significant
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interaction between the smallest debt APR and income (F (2, 235) =126.99, p<.05).
Figure 1 illustrates these results.

Figure 1. The influence of income and the interest rate on the proportion of income
allocated to debt with the smaller balance and the lower APR.
Consistent with the classical economic models, planned contrasts showed that
when the smallest balance had the highest APR, participants allocated a major proportion
of their income to the smallest balance, irrespective of their income level. In other words,
no difference was observed for the proportion of payment allocated to the smallest
balance among the three income levels (F (2, 118) =1.13, p>.05).
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In contrast, our results indicated that in the smallest balance with the lowest APR
condition, and consistent with H1, the proportion of payment allocated to the debt with
the smallest balance and the lowest APR for both people who had a $600 income (M$600
income=.78)

and a $400 income (M$400 income=.75) were significantly higher than for those

people who had a $200 income (M$200 income=.32; F (1, 117) =261.92, p<.05, and F (1,
117) =270.80, p<.05, respectively). No difference was found between the proportion of
payment allocated to the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR for both
people who had a $600 income and those who had a $400 income (F (1, 117) =1.51,
p>.05).

1.10.7 Discussion. A rational consumer should first pay off the debt with the
highest interest rate. Once this debt has been paid off completely, then the second most
expensive debt should be paid off, and so on. Our results indicated that this pattern only
existed when the smallest balance had the highest APR. Interestingly, however, we found
special conditions wherein borrowers departed from rational debt management. More
specifically, in support of H1, our results determined that borrowers’ tendency to reduce
the number of debt accounts as opposed to the total financial cost of debt emerged when
users passed a certain income level and the smallest balance had the lowest APR.
Consistent with the goal-gradient hypothesis (Kivetz et al., 2006), our findings indicated
that when people perceived actual progress toward debt account elimination by having
$600 income (i.e., they can pay off the entire debt on one of the credit cards) or they
thought they had sufficiently progressed toward becoming debt free by spending a $400
income toward their debt (i.e., the illusion of being so close to paying off the entire debt

27

on one of the credit cards), they allocated most of their income toward the debt with the
smallest balance and the lowest APR. We suspect that this irrational decision took place
because the total debt payment was in the distant future and people took an alternative
route (e.g., attaining sub-goals) to reduce the number of their debt accounts.
Contrary to the classic economic models, Study 1 demonstrated that people do not
always manage their credit card debt rationally. However, the experimental scenarios
used in this study neither articulated the purpose of the loan nor did they refer to the
timing of debt benefits. It would be insightful to explore whether the irrationality in debt
payment is influenced by these factors. We designed the following study to investigate
the concurrent effects of the nature (e.g., hedonic vs. utilitarian) and the timing of debt
benefits (e.g., past vs. future) on borrowers’ debt management.

1.11 Experiment 2

Experiment 2 tests the prediction that people’s decision in debt payment is often
affected by the nature and the timing of debt benefits. In particular, this study examines
the proposition that when consumption benefits have been realized in the past, people are
more willing to pay off the debt with the smallest balance associated with hedonic
consumption than utilitarian consumption (H2a). Conversely, when consumption benefits
are expected in the future, borrowers are more willing to pay off the debt with the
smallest balance associated with utilitarian consumption than hedonic consumption
(H2b).
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1.11.1 Pretests. We chose two vehicle upgrades to represent hedonic and
utilitarian benefits based on the results of two pretests. First, a group of undergraduate
students (n=26) read information about two possible upgrade packages for a vehicle,
namely luxury and technology packages. The luxury package included leather seats, seat
warmers, and panoramic sunroof, while the technology package offered in-dash GPS,
Tiptronic transmission, and an advanced suspension system. We told all participants that
both upgrades cost approximately $1,800. Then, subjects were asked to rate each upgrade
package based on ten 7-point semantic differential scales developed by Voss et al.
(2003): ineffective/effective; unhelpful/helpful, not functional/functional,
unnecessary/necessary, impractical/practical, fun/not fun, exciting/dull, delightful/not
delightful, thrilling/not thrilling, and enjoyable/unenjoyable. The first five items
measured the utilitarian dimension, while the second five items measured the hedonic
dimension of the upgrade package. Then, we subtracted the sum of the multi-item scale
measures for hedonism from that of utilitarianism to create a composite hedonism index
(Voss et al., 2003). We also counterbalanced the order of presentation of upgrade
packages to prevent any bias in responses. Overall, the results from this pretest found that
the luxury package, when compared to the technology package, had a higher composite
hedonism index. Consequently, it was found to be more hedonic in nature (M luxury
package=3.18

vs. M technology package=-1.52; t (1, 25) = 4.86, p<.05). Additionally, we asked

participants to indicate to what extent these upgrade packages were attractive (1=very
unattractive, 7=very attractive) and important (1=very unimportant, 7=very important) to
them. Findings showed that the upgrade packages were perceived to be equally attractive
and important to the subjects (F’s<1, p>.05).
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1.11.2 Design, participants, and procedure. This experiment is a 2 (nature of
debt: hedonic vs. utilitarian) x 2 (timing of the consumption benefits: past vs. future)
between subject factorial design. One hundred sixty-five undergraduate students from the
same university participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit
(Mage=22.48 years, SD=4.02; males=90 and females=75). A total of three responses were
deleted from further analyses as they either failed the manipulation checks or they were
incomplete.
An online survey with four scenarios was created and respondents were randomly
assigned to one of the conditions. The first two pages of the study were common to all
conditions. They described the purpose of the study and asked for consent to participate
in it. Similar to Study 1, subjects were told that they owned two credit cards from
different financial institutions, M and S. Credit card M had a debt of $600 @ 12% APR
and credit card S had a debt of $1,200 @ 18% APR. Participants were informed that the
total debt on both cards (e.g., $1,800) was incurred due to an upgrade to their vehicle.
When the type of debt was hedonic, the upgrade was presented as a luxury package that
included leather seats, seat warmers, and panoramic sunroof. Conversely, when the type
of debt was utilitarian, the upgrade was described as a technology package that included
in-dash GPS, Tiptronic transmission, and an advanced suspension system. In addition, we
manipulated the timing of debt benefits by telling one group of participants that the
upgrade was on a vehicle that they don’t own anymore (e.g., past consumption benefits),
whereas the other group was told that the upgrade was on a vehicle that they will own in
the near future (e.g., future consumption benefits). For example, the scenario for the
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credit card debt with the past hedonic benefits was as follows. Please note that the words
in the brackets denote the conditions in which the participants were randomly assigned.

“Imagine that you have recently graduated and are in a new job making
an after-tax salary of $3,600 dollars per month. You are keen to reduce
the debt you incurred while in college and, after paying for rent,
groceries, utilities, and entertainment, you have a balance of $600 dollars.
Currently, you have two credit cards, say, M and S. Credit card M has a
debt of $600 @ 12% APR and credit card S has a debt of $1,200 @ 18%
APR. Both debts were incurred for a luxury package upgrade (e.g., leather
seat, heated seats, and panoramic sunroof) [a technology package
upgrade (e.g., in-dash GPS, Tiptronic transmission, and an advanced
suspension system] on your current vehicle that you will own in the near
future [your old vehicle that you don’t own any longer].
Please indicate how you would use the budget to reduce your existing
debt. You could choose to allocate the budget to one of the accounts or
spread your money across both accounts.”

Toward the end of the survey, we also collected responses pertaining to the
manipulation check, level of involvement, and overall knowledge of credit card terms.

1.11.3 Independent variables.
1.11.3.1 Nature of debt. The nature of debt was manipulated at two levels:
hedonic and utilitarian. When the nature of the debt was hedonic, participants were told
that they were in debt because they upgraded their vehicle with a luxury package that
included leather seats, seat warmers, and panoramic sunroof. In contrast, when the debt
was utilitarian in nature, we informed subjects that their total debt was incurred because
they added a technology package including in-dash GPS, Tiptronic transmission, and an
advanced suspension system to their car.
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1.11.3.2 Timing of the consumption benefits. We framed the consumption
benefits associated with debt to be experienced either in the past or in the future. We told
one group o1f respondents that the debt was taken out for a consumption that was
realized in the past. More specifically, we told individuals that the debt was used toward
a package upgrade on a vehicle that they had already sold. In contrast, we told the second
group of subjects that the debt was used toward a consumption that will be satisfied in the
proximal future. More specifically, people who were assigned to this condition imagined
that the package upgrade was on a vehicle that they will own in the near future.

1.11.4 Dependent variable. Similar to Study 1, we measured the proportion of
budget allocated to the debt with the smallest balance to serve as the dependent variable.
First, participants used a sliding scale to determine how much of their existing budget
they wanted to allocate to each debt account. Then, the amount money that each person
allocated to the smallest balance was divided by $600 to calculate the proportion of
budget allocated to the smallest balance.

1.11.5 Covariates. Similar to Study 1, we controlled for participants’ overall
knowledge of credit card terms and their level of involvement with the task. Again, these
factors did not have any significant effect in the overall model and were not addressed in
the subsequent analyses.
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1.11.6 Results.
1.11.6.1 Manipulation check. We assessed the success of the manipulation of
the independent variables with two questions. First, we examined the manipulation of the
timing of debt benefits by asking respondents to rate the following question on a 7-point
Likert scale (1=strongly disagree and 7=strongly agree): “I seek benefits in the debt
associated with the vehicle package upgrade.” As was intended, subjects in the future
debt benefits condition sought more benefits than did those in the past (expired) debt
benefits condition (M future=5.68 vs. M past=2.82; t (1, 158) = 4.36, p<.05). Additionally,
we affirmed the hedonic nature of the luxury package and utilitarian nature of the
technology package by using the single-item measures of hedonism and utilitarianism
developed by Wertenbroch and Dhar (2000). In particular, at the end of the survey,
subjects in each condition were asked to indicate how they rate the vehicle package
upgrade on a single hedonic scale of zero (“not at all hedonic”) to six (“extremely
hedonic”) and a single utilitarian scale of zero (“not at all utilitarian”) to six (“extremely
utilitarian”). Then, we calculated a composite hedonism rating as the difference between
each subject’s hedonic rating and the utilitarian rating. This measure was also adopted
from the Wertenbroch and Dhar (2000) study. As was expected, the luxury package had a
higher composite hedonism rating than did the technology package (M luxury package=2.61
vs. M technology package=-.9; t (1, 158) = 4.11, p<.05).

1.11.6.2 Support for H2a and H2b. A 2 (nature of debt: hedonic vs.
utilitarian) x 2 (timing of the consumption benefits: past vs. future) ANOVA with the
proportion of budget allocated to the debt with the smallest balance as the dependent
variable produced a significant interaction between two factors (F (1, 158) =76.76,
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p<.05). However, neither the main effect for debt type (F (1, 158) =3.70, p>.05) nor the
main effect for debt benefits (F (1, 158) =.09, p>.05) on the proportion of budget
allocated to the debt with the smallest balance were significant. Planned contrasts
indicated that when benefits of consumption for which the debt was borrowed were
realized in the past, participants allocated more budget toward the debt with the smallest
balance when it was associated with the hedonic, as opposed to the utilitarian
consumption (M hedonic=.77 vs. M utilitarian=.54; F (1, 79) =74.10, p<.05). This finding
supports H2a. That is, among people who have debt on two credit cards, people manage
the debt associated with prior hedonic consumption more irrationally than the debt
associated with prior utilitarian consumption. On the contrary, when debt benefits were
expected to occur in the future, we found the effect to be reversed. That is, participants
allocated more budget toward the debt with the smallest balance when it was associated
with utilitarian as compared to hedonic consumption (M utilitarian=.73 vs. M hedonic=.59; F
(1, 79) =18.42, p<.05). Therefore, we support H2b which states that among people who
have debt on two credit cards, people manage the debt associated with the future
utilitarian consumption more irrationally than the debt associated with the future hedonic
consumption. Figure 3 illustrates these findings.

1.11.7 Discussion. Although both hedonic and utilitarian consumption offer
benefits to consumers and one is not superior than the other, our findings, in support of
H2a and H2b, demonstrated that debt payment decisions varied based on the nature and
the timing of debt benefits. More specifically, we found that when debt benefits were
realized in the past, people were more inclined to allocate money toward the debt with
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smallest balance and lowest APR when it was associated with hedonic consumption than
utilitarian consumption.

Figure 2. The influence of the purpose of debt and consumption benefits on the
proportion of income allocated to debt with the smaller balance and the lower APR

We argue that this effect occurred because consumption benefits were satisfied in
the past and hedonic experiences depreciated faster than utilitarian experiences (Voss et
al., 2003). Therefore, according to the “benefit depreciation” concept (Gourville and
Soman, 1998), the debt associated with past hedonic consumption appeared as a larger
loss than the equivalent debt attributed to past utilitarian consumption. However, we
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demonstrated that people allocated more money toward the debt with the smallest balance
and lowest APR when it was associated with hedonic consumption more so than
utilitarian consumption when consumption benefits were expected in the future.
Therefore, individuals were more likely to irrationally pay off the debt associated with
the utilitarian consumption than the hedonic consumption when consumption was
planned in the future. We think this reversal took place because people anticipated more
enjoyment from hedonic than utilitarian consumption (Shiv and Huber, 2000) and they
did not want to alter their emotional state by making a payment (Soman and Gourville,
2001).
This study in the context of debt management complements previous research
efforts that demonstrate preference reversals between hedonic and utilitarian alternatives
in decision contexts (Wertenbroch and Dhar, 2000) and presentation format (Okada,
2005). For example, Wertenbroch and Dhar (2000) found that a hedonic item, when
compared to the same utilitarian item, is selected more frequently in forfeiture than in
acquisition choices. Further, Okada (2005) determined that between two equivalent
hedonic and utilitarian options, people preferred the hedonic alternative over the
utilitarian one when each was presented singly. However, this preference was reversed
when the utilitarian and hedonic alternatives were presented simultaneously. Our study
extends this stream of research by showing that when the hedonic and utilitarian
consumption is linked to a credit card debt, it may carry negative connotations and may
imply a distinct perception of loss depending upon the timing of the consumption
occurrence.
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Study 1 and 2 explored the intrinsic attributes of debt (e.g., APR, timing, and the
nature of debt benefits) and their subsequent impact on irrational debt management.
Study 3 will examine the influence of external factors, such as the number of debt
accounts and the nature of allocated income on people’s irrational deb payment. In
addition, Study 3 will introduce the motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts as
the underlying mechanism for the effects we observed across all studies regarding
individuals’ tendency toward paying a debt with the smallest balance and the lowest
APR.

1.12 Experiment 3

This experiment examines the proposition that external factors, such as the
number of debt accounts and the type of allocated income, may also influence credit card
debt management. More specifically, this study tests the predictions that people tend to
manage their debt more irrationally when they have fewer number of debt accounts or
when they use their reward-based or windfall money for the purpose of debt payment.
We demonstrate that the proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smallest
balance significantly increases when people have two instead of five credit cards (H3)
and when they use windfall (H4a) or reward money (H4b), as opposed to a comparable
amount of savings, to pay off their debt. In addition, we provide a process evidence for
these findings. We suggest the motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts to be the
underpinning mechanism for the tendency toward irrational debt management (H5).
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1.12.1 Design, participants, and procedure. This experiment is a 2 (number of
credit cards: two vs. five) x 3 (type of income: savings vs. reward-based vs. windfall)
between subject factorial design. Two hundred seventy-eight undergraduate students
from the same university participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course
credit (Mage=22.46 years, SD=4.48; males=127 and females=150). A total of eight
responses were deleted from further analyses as they either failed the manipulation
checks or they were incomplete. Subjects completed an online survey and were randomly
assigned to one of the six possible conditions. The first two pages of the study were
common to all conditions. They described the purpose of the study and asked for consent
to participate in it.
In the scenarios, participants imagined that they had either two (e.g., M and S) or
five (e.g., M, N, P, R, and S) credit cards from different financial institutions, and the
total cost of recent home improvements were divided among these credit cards. In all
experimental conditions, credit card M carried a debt of $600 @ 12% APR and credit
card S had a debt of $1,200 @ 18% APR. In the five credit cards condition, credit cards
N, P, and R had different debt equal to $1,100, $1,400, and $1,000 @ 16% APR.
Depending upon the experimental manipulation, respondents were informed that after
they paid the minimum balance of their cards, they had a balance of $600 in savings, or
they had accumulated 6,000 reward points from an airline frequent flier program which
was equivalent to $600, or they received a bonus of $600 on their paycheck. Then, they
were asked to use their entire income, regardless of format, to pay off their existing debt
in any way that they preferred. The outcome was to observe how participants allocate
their budget among credit cards. The scenario for five credit cards and $600 of reward
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money is presented below. Please note that words in the brackets denote the conditions in
which the participants were randomly assigned.

“Imagine that you have recently graduated and are in a new job making
an after-tax salary of $3,600 per month. You are keen to reduce the debt
you incurred while in college, and after paying for rent, groceries,
utilities, and entertainment, you have a zero balance, but you have
accumulated 6,000 reward points from an airline frequent flier program
that allows you to cash in your points for $600 [You have a zero balance,
but you discover that you have received a bonus of $600 on your
paycheck/you have a balance of $600].
Currently, you have five credit cards, say, M, N, P, R, and S [two credit
cards, say M and S]. Credit card M has a debt of $600 @ 12% APR.
Credit cards N, P, and R have different debts of $1,100, $1,400, and
$1,000 @ 16% APR. Credit card S has a debt of $1,200 @ 18% APR
[Credit card S has a debt of $1,200 @ 18% APR]. The total debt was
incurred due to a home improvement project that you recently finished.
Please indicate how you would use the entire budget to reduce your
existing debt. You could choose to allocate the budget to one of the
accounts or spread your money across the accounts.”

After participants finished the debt payment decision, they were presented with
questions designed to measure participants’ motivation to reduce the number of debt
accounts. Next, subjects responded to the manipulation check questions. Finally, they
indicated their level of involvement and their overall knowledge of credit card terms.

1.12.2 Independent variables.
1.12.2.1 Number of credit cards. We manipulated the number of existing debt
accounts at two levels. The first group of respondents owned two credit cards from
different financial institutions, M and S. Credit card M had a debt of $600 @ 12% APR
and credit card S had a debt of $1,200 @ 18% APR. The second group of subjects owned
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five credit cards from different financial institutions, M, N, P, R, and S. Credit card M
had a debt of $600 @ 12% APR credit cards N, P, and R had debt equal to $1,100,
$1,400, and $1,000 @ 16% APR, correspondingly , and credit card S had a debt of
$1,200 @ 18% APR.

1.12.2.2 Type of allocated income. The type of income that participants were
allowed to use to pay down their credit card debt was manipulated at three levels. The
first group was told that they had $600 in their savings account. The second group was
told that their savings account was empty, but they had accumulated 6,000 reward points
from an airline frequent flier program that were worth $600. Finally, the last group
imagined that the balance of their savings account was zero, but they received a bonus of
$600 on their paycheck. We asked all participants to allocate their entire income toward
reduction of their credit card debt.

1.12.3 Dependent variable. Similar to previous studies, the dependent variable
was the proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance and the
lowest APR. First, participants used a sliding scale to determine how much of their
existing budget they wanted to allocate to each debt account. Then, the amount of money
that each person allocated to the smallest balance was divided by $600 to calculate the
proportion of income allocated to the smallest balance.

1.12.4 Process evidence. We elaborate our findings by identifying the underlying
cognitive process. We suggest that the tendency toward irrational debt management
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would be mediated by individuals’ motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts. To
the best of our knowledge, to date, no study has yet to develop a psychometrically sound
scale to measure this construct. We created an initial pool of six items to capture the
definition of this construct in the context of multiple credit cards. Items’ wordings were
reviewed by two independent judges to minimize ambiguity and ensure face validity.
We administered this scale with the sample used in Study 1 (n=152). After
participants allocated their budget toward debt payment, they were presented with six
items developed for the motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts construct. All
items were measured on a seven-point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree and 7=very
strongly agree). Field (2009) indicates that an item should be deleted from a pool of items
if it has an item-to-total correlation less than .5. One item did not meet this criterion and
was dropped from the items’ pool. Therefore, five items with a reasonable reliability
index (Cronbach’s alpha=.88) were retained for Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to
check the dimensionality of the scale. The maximum likelihood method as an inferential
technique and an iterative principle axis factoring as a mathematical approach were used.
Both methods conclusively found that this construct was one-dimensional, explaining
65% of the total variance. Therefore, the responses to the five items were averaged to
form a single variable for individuals’ motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts.
The items for this scale are shown in the appendix.

1.12.5 Covariates. Similar to previous studies, participants’ overall knowledge of
credit card terms and their level of involvement with the task were measured. Again,
these factors did not significantly influence the dependent variable and were not
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controlled in forthcoming analyses.

1.12.6 Results.
1.12.6.1 Manipulation check. We assessed the success of the manipulation of
the independent variables with two questions at the end of the survey. First, we asked
people in a multiple-choice question to select the option that properly indicated the
balance of credit card debt and their pertinent APRs. A total of nine individuals failed in
this task and were eliminated from the sample. Next, we used a recognition task wherein
people chose the amount and the type of income that they allocated to the debt accounts.
No respondents failed in this task. Therefore, a total of 269 responses which met the
above criteria were kept for further analyses.

1.12.6.2 Support for H3. We conducted an ANOVA on the proportion of
income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR as a function
of the number of credit cards and the type of allocated income. There was a significant
main effect of the number of credit cards (F (1, 263) = 185.60, p<.05) and a significant
main effect of the type of allocated income (F (2, 263) = 12.19, p<.05). These main
effects were also qualified by a significant interaction of the number of credit cards and
the type of income (F (2, 263) = 3.53, p<.05).
Planned comparisons tested the effects of the number of credit cards on the
proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance when the type of
income was savings, windfall, and reward-based. These tests determined that the
proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance declined
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significantly from the two credit card condition (M=.60) to the five credit card condition
(M=.38; F (1, 98) =57.93, p<.05), when savings were used. A similar pattern was also
observed for reward-based and windfall income conditions. More specifically, when the
income allocated to the debt payment was reward-based, there was a significant decrease
in the proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance between the
two and five credit card conditions (M two credit cards=.76 vs. M five credit cards=.43; F (1, 77)
=61.40, p<.05). The proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance
when participants allocated their windfall income toward debt payment also significantly
dropped from the two credit card condition (M=.77) to the five credit card condition
(M=.43; F (1, 88) =78.45, p<.05). Overall, these results support H4, stating that people
who have debt on two credit cards manage their debt more irrationally than people who
have debt on five credit cards.

1.12.6.3 Support for H4a and H4b. Additional follow-up planned contrasts
compared the proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance for
savings, windfall, and reward-based income at two different numbers of credit cards, two
and five. In support of H4a, when people had two credit cards, the proportion of income
allocated to the debt with the smaller balance for the windfall income (M=.77) was
significantly higher than that for the savings (M=.60; F (1, 125)=47.18, p<.05). In other
words, among people who have debt on two credit cards, people who use windfall money
manage their debt more irrationally than those who use the equivalent amount of money
from their savings. In addition, in the two credit card condition, we found that the
proportion of income allocated to the debt with the smaller was significantly greater
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when people used their reward-based income as compared to their savings (M rewardbased=.76

vs. M savings=.60; F (1, 125)=41.38, p<.05).

Figure 3. The influence of the number of credit cards and the type of income on the
proportion of income allocated to debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR

These results support H4b, which states that among people who have debt on two
credit cards, people who use reward points manage their debt more irrationally than
people who use the equivalent amount of money from their savings. By contrast, no
significant difference was observed in the proportion of income allocated to the debt with

44

the smallest balance and the lowest APR among the type of allocated budget when people
had five credit cards (F (2, 138) =.89, p>.05). Figure 3 illustrates these effects.

1.12.6.4 Process evidence. We conducted a mediated moderation analysis
with three regression models (Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt, 2005). Since the proportion of
income allocated to the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR did not differ
for reward-based and windfall budget in either the two credit card condition (M reward-based
= .76 vs. M windfall =.77; F<1) or the five credit card condition (M reward-based = .43 vs. M
windfall =

.43; F<1), to reduce the model’s complexity, we combined these two levels in

subsequent analysis. Hence, the type of income was coded as a dichotomous variable
(0=savings; 1=other types), as was the number of credit cards (0=two credit cards; 1=five
credit cards).Table 1 summarizes these regression models.
The first regression model revealed that the interaction between the number of credit
cards and the type of income had a significant influence on the proportion of income
allocated to the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR (t (1, 265) = -2.64,
p<.05). The second analysis determined that the interaction between the number of credit
cards and the type of income in the presence of main effects had a significant influence
on individuals’ motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts (t(1, 265) = 2.34,
p<.05). The third model indicated that when the motivation to reduce the number of debt
accounts (mediator), the main effects, and the interaction between the number of credit
cards and the type of income concurrently predicted the proportion of income allocated
the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR, the mediator was significant (t (1,
265) = 2.87, p<.05) and the interaction term became insignificant (t (1, 265) = -1.91,
p>.05). In Support of H5, results across the three models supported the motivation to
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reduce the number of debt accounts as a mediator of the effects of the number of credit
cards and the type of income on irrational debt payment (Muller et al., 2005).
The Sobel test also confirmed that the moderated effect of the number of credit
cards and the type of income on the proportion of income allocated the debt with the
smallest balance and the lowest APR via the mediator was significant (z=2.31, p<.05).

1.12.7 Discussion. This study explored the role of the number of credit cards and
type of income (e.g., savings, reward-based, and windfall) on irrational debt
management. In support of H3, our findings demonstrated that people who had debt on
two credit cards managed their debt more irrationally than people who had debt on five
credit cards. Debt on credit cards represents a potential loss when benefits have been
enjoyed in the past (Soman, 2001) and people generally close a mental account with a
negative utility (e.g., loss) once consumption benefits are fully received (Prelec and
Lowenstein, 1998). The explanation for our findings is derived from prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which indicates that the value function in the domain of
losses is steepest near zero and gradually becomes flatter when the number of losses
increases. Therefore, the relative reduction in the perception of loss achieved from
reducing the number of debt accounts from two to one is significantly more than reducing
the number of segregated debt from five to four.
Further, we found that among people who had debt on two credit cards, people
allocated more income toward the debt with the smallest balance and the lowest APR
when they used either windfall money (H4a) or reward-based money (H4b) than did
people who used the equivalent amount of money from their savings. We believe these
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effects occurred because parting with a resource that people earned with hard work (e.g.,
savings money) was more painful than money such as windfall or reward-based that was
earned effortlessly (Soman, 2001).Money that people did not work hard for it would be
spent more frivolously than normal income (Thaler, 1985) because individuals fail to
calculate the opportunity costs of these investments (Neumann and Friedman, 1980).
Hence, our participants paid relatively more attention to the total cost of debt
management as opposed to the number of existing debts when they used their savings.
We also offered insight regarding the underlying mechanism for these effects. Our
findings corroborated that the tendency toward irrational debt management was mediated
by individuals’ motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts (H5). Two plausible
mechanisms may have created this mediating process. First, the overall subjective
disutility from segregated losses is more than one aggregated loss (Hsee et al., 2008).
Therefore, participants may have focused on closing one of the debt accounts to improve
the overall utility of the remainder of the debt accounts. Second, the ultimate goal of
borrowers is to be debt free, but this goal is distant. However, there are other sub-goals
that are perceived to be proximal (e.g., fully paying down one of the credit card’s debt).
Research indicates that goal proximity enhances attention paid to the goal and the effort
exerted to attain it (Kivetz et al., 2006). Therefore, our subjects committed themselves to
pay off an individual loan (e.g., a proximal goal) at the expense of managing debt with
respect to the total cost of debt (e.g., distant goal).
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Table 1. The results of three regression models for testing the mediated moderation
Regression Model:1

Regression Model:2

Regression Model:3

DV: The proportion of
Income Allocated to the
Smallest Balance with the
Lowest APR

DV: Individuals’ Motivation
to Reduce the Number of Debt
Accounts

DV: The proportion of Income Allocated to
the Smallest Balance with the Lowest APR

Coefficien
t

t-value

pvalue

Coefficien
t

t-value

p-value

Coefficient

t-value

p-value

Intercept

1.03

1.63

.09

4.15

33.40

.00

.60

11.05

.00

Number of Credit Cards

-.25

-7.88

.00

-.24

-1.48

.14

-.25

-7.94

.00

.15

5.09

.00

-.41

-2.65

.01

.15

5.04

.00

-.05

-2.64

.01

.28

2.34

.02

-.05

-1.91

.06

.18

2.87

.00

Type of Income

Number of Credit Cards x
Type of Income

Individuals’ Motivation to
Reduce the Number of
Debt Accounts
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1.13 General Discussion and Conclusion

The use of credit cards has grown dramatically and credit card payments have
begun to replace cash and checks in most transactions. Despite the benefits, however,
using credit cards has its own costs. The convenience of use and non-immediacy of pain
of payment has caused about 46% of card holders to report self-control problems in
spending with credit cards (Bertaut and Haliassos, 2009). Recent credit card statistics find
that American customers have 801 billion dollars in revolving debt, resulting in an
average credit card debt of $15,956 per individual household (Federal Reserve Report,
2012). Also, industry reports indicate that American customers, on average, have five
credit cards and the average balance per open credit card is $1,157 (Wilcox, Block, and
Eisenstein, 2011). This research investigated how people manage multiple credit card
debt and how they prioritize their debt repayment.
In this paper, with the support of three experiments, we determined that
consumers under certain circumstances may manage their debt irrationally (i.e., choosing
the least optimal payment decision). Our findings in Study 1 demonstrated that when
people perceived actual progress or they thought that they had sufficiently progressed
toward debt account elimination, they allocated most of their income toward the debt
with the smallest balance and the lowest APR (H1). Study 2 demonstrated that debt
allocation decisions depend upon the nature and timing of debt benefits. More
specifically, consistent with H2a (H2b), we determined that when debt benefits were
realized in the past (future), people were more inclined to pay the debt with the smallest
balance when it was associated with hedonic (utilitarian) consumption rather than
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utilitarian (hedonic) consumption. Finally, Study 3 provides evidence that an increase in
the number of credit cards increases customers’ attention to the total cost of debt (H3).
Also, our findings revealed that a higher proportion of subjects with two debt accounts
allocated income toward the debt with the smallest balance when they used either
windfall money (H4a) or reward-based money (H4b) as opposed to money from savings.
These effects, however, were not observed when individuals carried five debt accounts.
The individuals’ motivation to reduce the total number of debt accounts was determined
to be the underlying mechanism for the debt payment anomaly (H5).

1.13.1 Theoretical implications. Our findings add to the existing literature on
financial decision making in the following ways. First, we demonstrate that individuals,
regardless of their income level, make a rational financial decision in debt payment when
the size of debt balances and their corresponding interest rates negatively correlate. For
example, individuals first pay a $300 debt with 20% APR and then they pay a $500 debt
with 15% APR. However, when people’s income meets (or is considerably close to) the
smallest balance and the size of debt balances corresponds with the size of interest rates,
irrational debt payment emerges. This counterintuitive finding is explained with goalgradient principle (Kivetz et al., 2006) that suggests that people accelerate effort toward
attainment of a goal when they have an illusion of progress toward it (i.e., individuals
allocate their income toward debt that can be successfully eliminated now or in the near
future). However, when individuals do not perceive progress toward debt payment (i.e.,
their income significantly falls below the balance of the smallest debt), they shift their
attention toward the goal of reducing the overall cost of debt. This notion is in line with
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the research by Amar et al. (2011) that indicates that eliminating participants’ ability to
completely pay off the smallest debt increases rational debt payment.
Additionally, this paper suggests that irrational debt management is derived from
people’s inherent tendency to reduce the number of debt accounts. Debts on credit cards
are perceived as losses and people are motivated to reduce the number of those losses as
soon as possible (Prelec and Lowenstein, 1998). Our work indicates that people
psychologically prioritize the allocation of their budget toward the debt with the smallest
balance and the lowest APR over the largest balance with the highest APR to satisfy their
desire to eliminate losses. Therefore, at the expense of managing debt with respect to the
total cost of debt (e.g., a distant goal), debtors paid off an individual loan with respect to
the desire for debt account elimination (e.g., a proximal goal).

1.13.2 Public policy implications. Policy makers can protect consumers’ welfare
by employing the findings of our research in the following ways. First, we argued that the
attainment of a sub-goal (i.e., eliminating one of the debt accounts) endangered the
pursuit of the superordinate goal (i.e., eliminating the total cost of debt). We think this
effect occurred because the psychological gain from closing one of the debt accounts
outweighed the financial loss from repayment of the less expensive debt. We attribute
this finding to consumers’ lack of understanding about compound APR. Research
demonstrates that consumers have difficulty understanding interest compounding (Stango
and Zinman, 2009) or they underestimate the exponential growth of their debt (McKenzie
and Liersch, 2011), especially when the consumer is not obligated to pay off their debt
within a certain period. Policy makers should shift borrowers’ focus from immediate
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outcomes to more distant outcomes by disclosing information that makes the future costs
more salient. Particularly, existing elements of credit card statements can be revamped to
assist consumers in calculating the compound interest in each billing cycle and convert it
into dollar currency. This suggestion has yet to take place, but there has been some effort
to increase consumers’ financial literacy. For example, U.S. Credit Card Accountability,
Responsibility, and Disclosure (CARD) recently required lenders to display “Minimum
Payment Warning” in all monthly credit cards statements. This warning discloses the
total amount of money (principal plus interest) that will ultimately be paid if consumers
only make minimum monthly payments.
Additionally, this paper suggests that the deviation from rational debt payment
will be attuned when debtors’ budgets are significantly less than the balance on the
smallest card with the lowest APR. Although neither policy makers nor lenders can
directly control an individual’s income level, they can promote consolidation offers to
borrowers with multiple credit card debt to integrate their existing debt accounts into
fewer, if not one, debt. By doing so, individuals not only can reduce the disutility of
segregated debts and lower the overall interest rate, but they can also mitigate their
vulnerability to pay off the most expensive debt (i.e., the debt with the smallest balance
and the lowest APR).

1.13.3 Managerial implications. The study of credit card debt management is
equally important to financial institutions as it is to consumer researchers and policy
makers. Lenders risk their assets because credit cards are unsecured loans. Creditors are
keen to know how much potential interest they can earn from debtors and how
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individuals prioritize payments in their debt portfolio. Our findings indicate that debt
repayment depends upon the nature and the timing of the debt benefits. In particular,
when debt benefits were satisfied in the past, people allocated their budget toward more
hedonic-based debt than toward utilitarian-based debt. However, this preference reversed
when consumption benefits were expected in the future. Credit card companies should
create credit cards that promote hedonic and utilitarian consumptions differently. This is
because the life span of hedonic consumption is typically very short when compared to
utilitarian consumption (Voss et al., 2003) and people quickly adapt to it (Kahneman and
Snell, 1990). In doing so, lenders can ensure that they can expedite the repayment of the
credit card balance by moving up this balance in the hierarchy of customers’ debts. For
example, customers are more tempted to use their Diners Club International credit card
for travel and entertainment because they receive experiential rewards and unique
frequent flyer miles. Since the hedonic benefits will depreciate quickly, the customers are
more willing to pay the debt attributed to these type of consumption. Alternatively, Home
Depot credit card rewards consumers with five points for home/garden improvements
purchases and ten points for tools per every dollar spent. Since the nature of these
purchases is utilitarian and the benefit of the purchase will be ongoing for many years,
customers who incurred debt by using the Home Depot credit card will be more willing
to pay off their debt.

1.13.4 Directions for future research. Our research yields several interesting
areas for future research. Our findings show that people try to reduce the total number of
debt accounts, even though it is financially irrational. An interesting question left for
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future research is whether individuals’ tendency to reduce the number of debt accounts
would persist when they consider opening a new debt account. In addition, it would be
insightful to find out whether the theories provided in this paper would apply similarly in
the context of a decision to open a new debt account. For example, a customer visits an
electronic store to buy a new digital camera to replace their old camera that no longer
works. The new camera costs $300. The salesman asks the customer if he would like to
open a new credit card with an interest rate of 4% APR to buy the new camera. Will the
customer accept or decline this offer knowing that he owns two other debt accounts with
higher interest rates, for instance 12% and 18%? Does the customer’s decision depend on
the price of the item? Does the customer’s response differ if he can afford to pay the cost
of the camera with cash? Will the outcome of the decision change if the consumer owns
four debt accounts instead of two?
Another topic for future research is the psychological differences that exist
between the elimination of debt accounts and the consolidation of debt accounts. When
individuals pay off one (or more) debt, the total amount of debt across all credit cards is
reduced. However, when individuals consolidate many debt accounts into a fewer
number of debt accounts, the total balance of the debt does not change. For example,
when debt accounts were consolidated, Amar et al. (2011) found that the proportion of
money suboptimally allocated toward a debt with the smallest balance and lowest APR
was significantly decreased. On the contrary, we showed the reverse result, meaning that
that the proportion of money allocated toward a debt with the smallest balance and lowest
APR was significantly increased when the number of credit cards was reduced. As we
pointed out earlier, these findings do not necessarily contradict each other. Rather, the
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way debtors cognitively processed two debt scenarios was perhaps different. Further
research is needed to shed light on these differences.
Future research should also investigate the role of emotions in debt repayment
decision more closely. The current paper discusses the psychology of the debt payment
from the cognitive perspective and shows that debtors prioritize the repayment of the debt
with the smallest balance and the lowest APR over the debt with the largest balance and
the highest APR. While we discussed that this decision was irrational, we did not explore
whether individuals already knew that their decision was irrational. They might have
demonstrated this behavior because they received emotional benefits from their actions.
Research shows that people regularly monitor their affective states in order to adjust them
to more comfortable states. More specifically, when people are in a negative emotional
state, they generally want to feel better, and this decision becomes a proximal goal to
initiate different activities to repair their mood (Tice et al., 2001). Additional research is
warranted to tease out the cognitive and affective processes underlying the management
of multiple debt accounts.

1.13.5 Limitations. The present research was not without limitations. The first
limitation is the nature of our sample. We used a convenient sampling method by
recruiting undergraduate student subjects, and to that extent, we cannot generalize our
findings to the general population. Although our respondents reported that they had a
minimum of two credit cards and almost 65% of them were revolving their credit cards
debt, our sample does not mimic the profile of the overall population who have credit
cards debt. The second limitation is the nature of the stimuli. We employed scenario54

based experiments and we did not measure participants’ actual credit cards debt.
Although we controlled for individual’s overall knowledge about credit cards terms, it
does not ensure that people have adequate debt management experience, especially in the
exponential growth of interest compounding (McKenzie and Liersch, 2011). Third, we
simplified the design of our credit card scenarios and did not communicate more detailed
information such as due dates and credit limits for the credit cards. We suspect that
individuals who carry debt accounts with different limits and due dates may prioritize
their debt repayment differently. Finally, our findings from the second experiment
regarding the nature and the timing of debt should be interpreted with caution. We
manipulated the timing of the consumption benefits for a product that individuals did not
possess at the time of the debt payment decision. In real life situations, however, people
may incur future debt for a product that they currently own. For example, many sales
promotion deals currently offer the zero cost of ownership to consumers and no debt
payment is required until a certain point in future.
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Essay 2:
Saving by Overspending

2.1 Overview

There are various occasions where consumers prepay before a consumption
decision. This paper suggests that under certain conditions, prepayment functions as a
justification mechanism for temptation in the forms of overspending and indulgent
consumption. Findings from two experiments indicate that monetary prepayments that
are anticipated and are spent without consideration of consumption avoidance goals lead
to the highest level of temptation. However, when consumption avoidance goals are
accessible or a monetary prepayment incurs without anticipation, consumers are able to
regulate their consumption and spending behavior. In addition, our results indicate that
prepayments made with non-monetary resources, such as time and effort, substantially
differ from monetary prepayments and, irrespective of their anticipation, yields to
temptation. Pain of prepayment is suggested as the underlying process for these
observations.
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2.2 Introduction

Mrs. Anderson works in an office in Manhattan, New York. Twice a week,
Mrs. Anderson and her coworkers meet at a local bar for happy hour. The
local bar charges a $10 entrance fee on Fridays, but it is free to enter
during the rest of the week. Although the menu does not change on
Fridays, Mrs. Anderson notices that her bill is more expensive on Fridays
than any other day she visits the bar.

The above scenario is not very rare. We often encounter very similar
circumstances in our daily lives in which we make a prepayment before a consumption
decision. In the back of our minds, we are trying to get our investment’s worth, when, in
fact, we are just spending our money irrationally. This paper uses reason-based choice
theory (Shafir et al., 1993) and affective restoration model (Tice et al., 2001) to indicate
that prepayment toward a consumption goal may result in temptation in the forms of
overspending (e.g., spending with no guilt) and indulgent consumption (e.g., choosing
vice over virtue). This paper suggests that consumers are cognizant of the extra time,
effort, and money they have to put forth in a monetary or non-monetary prepayment.
Therefore, they will take actions to justify the cost of their investment, even if that means
yielding to overspending and indulgent choice.
Thaler (1980) suggests a mental accounting framework by which people code,
categorize, and evaluate economic outcomes. Once the cost of payment is experienced,
consumers create a mental account that functions as self-specified allowances and serves
as a guide in evaluation (Cheema and Soman, 2006). Recent findings indicate that people
can regulate their food consumption by assigning calories to different food categories.
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Doing so makes the mental accounting more deliberate and the amount of consumed
calories more salient (Krishnamurthy and Prokopec, 2010). Similarly, Raghubir and
Srivastava (2008) demonstrate that the likelihood of spending is reduced when an
equivalent sum of money is coded into a single mental account (e.g., one $20 bill)
relative to many smaller mental accounts (e.g., 20 $1 bills). Further, the saliency of the
payment may also draw people’s attention to the mental accounting rules, which in turn,
results in spending (Soman, 2001) and consumption regulation (Thomas, Desai, and
Seenivasan, 2011). For example, Soman (2001) demonstrates that people who pay with
cash have better control over their expenditures compared to those who pay with a credit
card. In that same vein, Thomas et al. (2011) find that the use of cash payments over
credit cards strengthens impulse control and decreases unhealthy food decisions. This
happens because customers’ assets deplete immediately and the disutility (pain) of
payment is more salient with the cash payment as compared to the credit card payment in
the mental account.
Nevertheless, the exertion of self-control by the use of mental accounting is not a
general rule and can be violated under certain circumstances. The violation of self-control
principles are revealed with an impulsive decision about spending excessively and/or
making an indulgent choice (Wilcox et al., 2009). This essay examines prepayment as
one of the criterion through which the use of mental accounting, instead of regulating
consumption and spending, may result in excessive spending and indulgent consumption.
We offer both cognitive and affective explanations to account for this counter-intuitive
effect.
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First, from the cognitive standpoint, mental accounting principles are sometimes
influenced by reason-based choices that seek to explain consumer preferences are based
on reasoning (Kivetz, 1999; Kivetz and Simonson, 2002). Consumers often seek reasons
to justify their choices (Shafir et al., 1993), especially when their decisions conflict with
their personal values (e.g., spending on hedonic instead of utilitarian options). For
example, Shafir and Thaler (2006) examine how wine collectors value wine that they
originally purchased for $25 that now sells for $75. Their results indicate that most wine
connoisseurs feel that consuming the wine costs them nothing. In fact, the justification of
purchasing a $25 bottle of wine that can be sold for $75 facilitates individuals’
consumption decision. Similarly, Thaler (1985) argues that the purchase of a hedonic
product is guilt-free when the decision is justified as an investment rather than as
consumption. Therefore, we believe that reason-based decisions will counteract the pain
of payment and restrictions on consumption and spending when prepayments are justified
as investments toward a consumption goal. For example, a consumer who pays a $10
V.I.P cover charge to enter a club will be more willing to spend money at the bar to
justify the cost of the initial payment than a consumer who enters the club for free. This is
because people who pay $10 will consider it as deserving that has been earned.
Second, from the affective perspective, when an initial cost is incurred without the
return of an immediate benefit, people experience negative feelings (Cheema and Soman,
2008; Soman, 1998). Research indicates that people regularly monitor their affective
states in order to adjust them to more comfortable states (Yi and Baumgartner, 2004).
More specifically, the “affect restoration model” (Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister,
2001) notes that when people are in a negative emotional state, they generally want to
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feel better, and this decision becomes a proximal goal to initiate different activities to
repair their mood. Freedom from self-control is one method that subconsciously helps
people to improve their mood and overcome their prior negative frame of mind
(Baumeister, 2002). For example, Tice et al. (2001) empirically confirm that people who
are in a sad mood are more likely to eat unhealthy foods as compared to those people
who are in a neutral emotional state. Hence, people who make a prepayment and want to
overcome their negative mood are more likely to regulate their mood by the means of
indulgent consumption and over-spending than people who do not make a prepayment.
In addition, this paper extends the concept of prepayments to currencies other
than money. The total cost of consumption often entails a prepayment made with
behavioral resources such as time or effort. For instance, consumers may spend some
time and effort searching on the internet for the cheapest airline ticket before they book a
flight. Existing literature suggests that individuals’ commitment to attain a planned
decision escalates if they have already devoted resources to its attainment (Soster et al.,
2010; Monga and Saini, 2009). This robust phenomenon has been referred to as “sunk
cost effect” and it usually results in suboptimal monetary and non-monetary decisions
(Cunha and Caldieraro, 2009; Soman and Cheema, 2001).
The current research proposes that similar to the monetary prepayment,
prepayments made with behavioral resources would result in excessive spending and
indulgent consumption. However, the magnitude of this effect compared to that of the
monetary prepayment depends on the anticipation of prepayments. More specifically,
when prepayment is anticipated prior to the consumption decision, we show that the sunk
cost effect for behavioral prepayments is less than that for monetary prepayment. That is,
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among people who anticipate prepayment, those who prepay with money are more
inclined to overspend and indulge in subsequent decisions than individuals who prepay
with behavioral resources. This proposition is consistent with the findings in the existing
literature regarding the sunk cost effect in the realms of money, effort, and time (Soman,
2001; Navarro and Fantino, 2009). However, when the prepayment toward a
consumption decision is unanticipated, we propose the reverse pattern between the sunk
cost effect of monetary and behavioral prepayments. As such, people tend to spend and
indulge more in subsequent decisions when unanticipated prepayment was made with the
behavioral currency than money.
When people anticipate a prepayment toward a consumption goal, they open a
mental budget as a self-allowance mechanism to track their expenses. Heath and Soll
(1996) suggest that individuals who devote resources to the attainment of an outcome
demonstrate the escalation of commitment by seeking benefits to recover the cost of their
payment. Since people easily lose track of their behavioral investments (Ariely and
Loewenstein, 2000; Soman, 2001) and the opportunity cost of behavioral resources is
often neglected (Frederick et al., 2009), we propose that the magnitude of the sunk cost
effect (i.e., the degree of failure to achieve the optimal decision) would be greater for a
monetary than a non-monetary prepayment when consumers anticipate such payment
prior to consumption. However, when prepayment is unanticipated, consumers do not
create a designated mental account to regulate their future decisions after their budget is
depleted (Thaler, 1985). This happens because consumers do not have time or cognitive
resources to spontaneously create a mental account (Stilley et al., 2010). Heath (1995)
asserts that investments which are easily tracked by individuals but they do not belong to
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a mental budget result in de-escalation of commitment. That is, individuals are not
tempted to seek additional benefits when an investment is easily managed but it does not
fit into their mental budget limit. Hence, we suggest that the de-escalation of commitment
only applies to monetary prepayment because the opportunity cost of money is more
readily accessible from memory (Okada and Hoch, 2004) and individuals are better able
to keep track of monetary costs (Soster et al., 2010). However, non-monetary investments
are not subject to de-escalation of commitment because they are usually underestimated
and not easy to track (Soman, 2001; Hoskin, 1983). For instance, customers who
unexpectedly wait an hour to enter a club may subsequently indulge more at the bar than
those who unexpectedly pay a $10 V.I.P cover charge, given that the average hourly
wage is $10.

2.3 Monetary Prepayment Violates Self-control

Mental accounting is a method by which people regulate their consumption
behavior (Soman, 2001; Heath and Soll, 1996). People open a dedicated mental account
upon making a payment and close it when the consumption benefits are fully received
(Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998). Consumers create arbitrary mental accounts as selfspecified allowances to ensure they will abide by their consumption/spending budget
(Thaler, 1985). Cheema and Soman (2008) suggest that the partitioning of an aggregate
quantity of a resource (e.g., food, money) draws people’s attention to the small
transaction cost associated with each portion. As a result, since people open separate
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mental accounts for each transaction, they are better able to control their consumption.
For example, in the Weight Watchers program, each food is assigned a point value.
Members are encouraged to limit their total daily consumption to a pre-specified number
of points (Krishnamurthy and Prokopec, 2010). Similarly, Raghubir and Srivastava
(2008) demonstrate that the likelihood of spending is reduced when an equivalent sum of
money is presented with a big denomination (e.g., one $20 bill) relative to many small
denominations (e.g., 20 $1 bills).
There are numerous occasions wherein consumers commit to a consumption goal
by making a monetary prepayment. Consumers may pay a $5 convenience fee to reserve
a table at a restaurant, while others may pay a $10 V.I.P charge to enter a club to avoid
waiting in line. However, contrary to the findings regarding the restrictive role of mental
accounting on consumption and spending, our paper hypothesizes that when consumers
make a prepayment toward a consumption goal, they lose self-control by means of
overspending and choosing an indulgent choice.
In the marketing domain, the loss of self-control is typically revealed via an
impulsive decision about spending excessively and/or making an indulgent choice
(Wilcox et al., 2009). While most people aim to spend their money wisely and avoid
unnecessary expenses, they may indulge by overspending in an unplanned shopping
situation (Hirschman, 1990). Alternatively, violation of self-control may appear in the
form of choosing to consume hedonic products or “vices” (as opposed to utilitarian
products or “virtues”) as the purchase or consumption of vices is harder to justify than
that of virtues (Okada, 2005). Since the current literature attributes the sunk cost effect to
cognitive (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Thaler, 1985) and affective (Wong and Kwong,
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2007) reasons, we delineate the role of prepayment on the loss of self-control by the use
of reason-based choice theory (Shafir et al., 1993) and the affective restoration model
(Tice et al., 2001).
First, from the cognitive perspective, reason-based choice theory (Shafir et al.,
1993) indicates that individuals often justify their actions, especially when the decision is
complex (e.g., choosing between multiple attractive options) or it interferes with
normative values (e.g., choosing a hedonic product over a utilitarian one). Research
shows that the mental accounting process is subjective and consumers have flexibility in
coding expenses to justify their spending (Cheema and Soman, 2006). The malleability of
mental accounts allows individuals to participate in “creative book keeping” to justify
their expenses and consumption habits. Consumers believe that they need a good reason
to indulge in order to minimize the guilt and/or regret that they experience throughout the
consumption decision (Kivetz and Zheng, 2006). There are numerous incidences
regarding the dominance of the justification process over the mental accounting principle.
Since people enjoy rewarding themselves for their altruistic behavior, Strahilevitz and
Myers (1998) observed that donations to charities are better practiced with hedonic
products or “vices” than with utilitarian products or “virtues.”
Thaler (1985) argues that mental accounting rules are often abused to justify
pleasurable consumption and do not actually restrain consumption. When justification
rules dominate, decision makers are able to create a new mental account to justify their
purchase. By doing so, consumers often create “guilt-free” zones for themselves to enjoy
spending with no or little guilt (Thaler, 1985). In that same vein, Kivetz (1999) asserts
that a reason-based decision may sometimes counteract the mental accounting principles
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to eliminate restrictions on consumption and spending. Even consumers with hyperopia
(e.g., farsightedness) often indulge when they have a compelling reason (Kivetz and
Zheng, 2006). Since a decision maker has an internal need to justify prior investments to
avoid considering them as wasteful (Schaubroeck and Davis, 1994), we believe this
desire to compensate for the perceived loss of a prepayment guides individuals toward
overspending and indulgent consumption compared to those who did not make a
prepayment (e.g., “I deserve to be easy on myself tonight because I already paid to enter
the club”).
Alternatively, from the affective standpoint, Brenner et al. (2007) find that people
may close a mental account to negate negative emotions. By doing so, they create a
psychological gain that helps them to manage potential future losses (Fishbach and
Labroo, 2007). Further, the affect restoration model (Tice et al., 2001) indicates that
when people are in a negative emotional state, they generally want to feel better. This
desire becomes a proximal goal to initiate different activities to repair their mood (Labroo
and Patrick, 2009). People regularly monitor their affective states to adjust them to more
comfortable circumstances (Yi and Baumgartner, 2004). When people are upset, the goal
of feeling better precipitates the goal of regulating behavior. Tice et al. (2001)
demonstrate that people who are in a sad mood are more likely to eat unhealthy foods
compared to those people in a neutral emotional state. Yielding to temptation may help
people to improve their mood and overcome their prior negative state of mind (Yi and
Baumgartner, 2004). Moreover, Schaller and Cialdini (1990) confirm that negative
emotions induce a motivational drive to restore one’s mood. Therefore, this paper
proposes that negative emotions evoked by prepayment can be neutralized through
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overspending and indulgent consumption. For example, if a person, upon his arrival, is
charged a $10 valet parking fee to go to his favorite restaurant, he will spend more money
on food to make up for the fact that he paid $10 to get into the restaurant. Accordingly,
we propose the following hypothesis:

H1: People who make a prepayment toward a consumption goal are more
likely to lose self-control than people who do not make a prepayment.

Recently, Krishnamurthy and Prokopec (2010) demonstrate that mental accounts
regulate impulsive consumption successfully when they are combined with consumption
avoidance goals. In their study, participants imagined a shopping trip during which they
were offered tempting desserts for free. The avoidance goal was activated either by
asking subjects to think about reasons not to engage in the consumption or by framing the
decision in terms of choosing versus rejecting. Their findings indicate that mental
accounting is only effective for the exertion of self-control when avoidance goals are
accessible. Given Krishnamurthy and Prokopec (2010)’s findings, one should expect the
temptation justification for prepayment to disappear when the avoidance aspect of
consumption behavior is made accessible. In other words, we propose that when
individuals are informed about the negative consequences of impulsive consumption,
they would restrain from temptation.
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H2: The temptation for people who prepay toward a consumption goal is
attenuated when the consumption avoidance goal is present.

2.4 Prepayment Currencies and Loss of Self-control

People open a dedicated mental budget for their investment and track it against
their budget (Thaler, 1985). When an investment toward a goal is anticipated, people set
their mental budget such that the cost of the investment can be accommodated. For
example, a consumer who decides to go to a steakhouse restaurant on a date would
consider designating a mental account worth $100 for his dining costs. Existing literature
suggests that individuals’ commitment to attain a planned decision escalates if they have
already devoted resources to its attainment (Monga and Saini, 2009). This phenomenon is
known as “sunk cost effect” and it usually results in suboptimal monetary and nonmonetary decisions (Cunha and Caldieraro, 2009; Soman and Cheema, 2001). Heath and
Soll (1996) suggest that when an investment falls below or meets the limit of a mental
budget, it escalates the sunk cost effect. As such, individuals seek benefits to recover the
cost of their payment.
A new stream of research has recently evolved that examines the effect of
behavioral investments such as time (Okada and Hoch, 2004) and effort (Mogilner and
Aaker, 2009) on consumers’ perception and decision making. While sunk cost effect is
most apparent in the context of financial decisions, Navarro and Fantino (2009) suggest
that sunk cost effect also emerges with behavioral investments. That is, in the absence of
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any explicit monetary payments, people seek to obtain rewards from the time they spend
on a task (Rajagopal and Rha, 2009). Similarly, Soster et al. (2010) find that when people
use the same mental accounting period for both money and time, sunk cost effects are
observed for both. Further, Kivetz (2005) extends the mental accounting principles to
effort as the currency of a transaction. He notes that there is a congruity between the
rewards that individuals choose and the amount of consumption effort they devote to a
task. By choosing an effort-congruent reward, consumers establish their consumption
behavior to reflect their preferences in return for the amount of effort they invested prior
to the consumption.
People tend to plan better and spend their money more wisely for their monetary
investments than for behavioral investments (Ziberman and Lynch, 2005; Hirschman,
1990). Also, research shows that people keep track of their monetary investments and
consider their opportunity costs more so than behavioral resources (Frederick et al.,
2009). Overall, the consensus is that while mental accounting can be constructed for time
and effort (Kivetz and Zheng, 2006; Monga and Saini, 2009), the sunk cost effect of
behavioral investments are weaker than that of monetary investments (Soman, 2001;
Zauberman and Lynch, 2005). The reason is that individuals either fail to calculate the
equivalent monetary costs of time and effort when unstated (Neumann and Friedman,
1980) or they underestimate them when prompted (Hoskin, 1983). In other words, when
people invest behavioral resources, they notice the pain of investment, but they are less
sensitive to their loss when compared to a monetary investment (Cunha and Caldieraro,
2009). Hence, we propose that the loss of self-control caused by prepayment would be
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greater for an anticipated monetary prepayment than for an anticipated non-monetary
prepayment.

H3a: When a prepayment is anticipated, people who prepay with money
are more likely to lose self-control than those who prepay with time which
is comparable to that money.

H3b: When a prepayment is anticipated, people who prepay with money
are more likely to lose self-control than those who prepay with effort
which is comparable to that money.

Money is a typical currency for transactions and it keeps its face value in an
exchange. Therefore, it is easy to assign a monetary payment to a corresponding mental
account (Soman, 2001). Conversely, people easily lose track of time (Ariely and
Loewenstein, 2000) and choices are not temporally driven (Ebert and Prelec, 2007). The
opportunity cost of money can be readily calculated and is approximately constant across
varying situations (Hirschman, 1990). However, the opportunity cost of time and effort
are often neglected (Frederick et al., 2009).
Heath (1995) argues that when an investment is easy to keep track of but it
exceeds the limit of a mental budget, a reverse sunk cost effect may occur. It means that
people who have devoted their resources toward the attainment of a goal, they resist the
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pursuit of that goal. He refers to this behavior as de-escalation of commitment. In this
case, people are not willing to justify a previous investment that appears to have been a
loss. When consumers make an unexpected payment, they do not create a designated
mental account so that they can regulate their future decisions when their budget is
depleted (Thaler, 1985). This happens because consumers do not have time or cognitive
resources to spontaneously create a mental account (Stilley et al., 2010). Therefore, when
people make an unanticipated monetary prepayment that is not encoded into a mental
account, we propose that they would exercise self-control as a result of a reverse sunk
cost effect. For instance, a person who expects to pay a $10 admission fee to a festival,
but ends up paying $20, may constrain his spending at the festival to make up for the
unanticipated sunk cost.
Alternatively, when people experience difficulty in setting mental budgets and the
investments are not easily traceable, the escalation of commitment emerges (Heath,
1995). When people make an unanticipated behavioral prepayment, we believe that the
sunk cost effect still persists due to the difficulty in constructing a representative mental
account, and consequently, tracking the behavioral investment (Okada and Hoch, 2004).
Cheema and Soman (2006) note the malleability of mental accounting. They find that
people are flexible when assigning expenses to different mental accounts when they are
faced with ambiguous expenses such as time or effort. Cunha and Caldieraro (2009)
believe that investing behavioral resources without an instant reward is an undesirable
cognitive and emotional task. Similarly, Kivetz and Zheng (2006) note that hard work or
entitlement justifies self-gratification. In this case, individuals are convinced that they
have worked beyond their expectations and they deserve a reward. Therefore, they
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choose to boost the enjoyment and desirability of their decision by relaxing their
consumption regulation (Kivetz and Simonson, 2002). For instance, when a restaurant
has an unanticipated wait, a consumer who does not pay valet and waits for 50 minutes to
be seated may choose more indulgent food than a consumer who pays $10 valet to be
seated right away. Therefore, we hypothesize the followings:

H4a: When a prepayment is unanticipated, people who prepay with effort
are more likely to lose self-control than those who prepay with money
which is comparable to that effort.

H4b: When a prepayment is unanticipated, people who prepay with time
are more likely to lose self-control than those who prepay with money
which is comparable to that time.

2.5 Why Do These Effects Occur?

Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) suggests that people are more
sensitive to losses than to corresponding gains relative to their current reference point.
That is, for the equivalent gain and loss, the loss will be accentuated relative to the
corresponding gain and the net utility will be negative. Payment represents a potential
loss, especially when the benefits are not immediately sought (Thaler, 1980). Prelec and
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Lowenstein (1998) believe that people feel pain when making a payment, especially
when their payment is loosely decoupled from consumption. The pain of payment
associated with depleted resources may remain in the individuals’ mind until that mental
account is closed (Soman, 2001). The potential pleasure of consumption and the pain of
payment are even supported by neuroscientific evidence (Knutson et al. 2007). In
particular, this stream of research suggests that individuals have immediate affective
reactions to potential gain and loss that indicate the outcome of a purchase decision. The
pain of payment represents the overall negative feelings of parting with valuable
resources and is largely determined by the nature of the invested resources (Thomas et
al., 2011).
Prelec and Lowenstein (1998) confirm that paying with cash elicits a greater sunk
cost effect than paying with other modes of payment. Similarly, Soman (2001) indicates
that the pain of payment is immediate in the case of cash payment, whereas the pain is
attenuated in the case of credit card payment. In the case of a cash payment, the pain of
payment is noticeable as customers’ assets deplete immediately from the mental account.
However, the payment disutility from a credit card payment is less salient and less
traceable in the mental account. Further, Raghubir and Srivastava (2008) extend the
notion of the pain of payment to spending behavior. According to their findings, people
who use currencies in which the pain of payment was not salient (e.g., $50 voucher
instead of $50 bill) spend more while shopping.
Thaler (1985) suggests that all types of investments create negative feelings, but
with different intensity. Payments that are transparent in nature (e.g., cash) are more
painful than payments that may not feel or appear as real (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998).
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In other words, reducing the salience of parting with resources psychologically reduces
the barrier to spend. Although behavioral and monetary investments are inherently
different, findings confirm that individuals experience negative affect with different
intensities when these resources are depleted (Monga and Saini, 2009; Soster et al.,
2010). Consistent with the current literature, this paper proposes that the pain associated
with prepayment (e.g., the negative feelings of parting with valuable resources) is the
mechanism causing indulgence. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the interaction between
the currencies (e.g., time, effort, or money) and the anticipation of prepayment will
ultimately lead to the loss of self-control based upon the pain experienced after making a
prepayment.

H5: The interaction between the currencies and the anticipation of
prepayment on the propensity to lose self-control is significantly mediated
by the pain of payment.

2.6 Overview of Studies

In summary, this paper proposes that making a monetary prepayment toward a
consumption goal causes people to lose self-control in the forms of overspending and
indulgent consumption. In addition, this research extends the currency of prepayment to
other contexts such as time and effort. It hypothesizes that consumers’ temptation
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increases (decreases) when consumers do not anticipate (anticipate) prepaying with
effort-based or temporal-based resources compared to monetary resources.
Two experiments are designed to examine these predictions. Experiment 1 uses a
scenario study to test H1 and H2. Subjects read a scenario about making a monetary
prepayment for a food festival. Then, they indicate their preference for various types of
snacks and the amount of money they are willing to pay for their selected snacks at the
event. We propose that people, who make a prepayment and are not primed with a
consumption avoidance goal, demonstrate the highest level of self-indulgence and
overspending.
In the second experiment, we test H3a, H3b, H4a, and H4b, as well as the
underlying process, H5, in a service context. Participants are provided with a situation of
attending a restaurant and making prepayment with different currencies (e.g., money,
time, or effort) to enter the restaurant. Then, they are asked to list the type of appetizers
that they would like to order. We propose that when the prepayment is anticipated, people
who prepay with money are more willing to overspend and indulge than individuals who
prepay with behavioral resources comparable to that money. Conversely, we expect to
find the opposite effect when prepayments are unanticipated. Also, we show that the
perceived pain of prepayment is the underlying process for the loss of self-control.
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2.7 Experiment 1

Experiment 1 tests the prediction that making a prepayment shifts people’s
preference toward more vice choices and increases the amount of expenditures for a
consumption goal. However, we propose that this effect only holds when consumption
avoidance goals are not primed. This means that when subjects are asked to think of
reasons to avoid engaging in a consumption behavior, the preference for vice over virtue
and overspending tendency diminishes.

2.7.1 Design, participants, and procedure. This experiment is a 2 (prepayment:
no vs. yes) x 2 (consumption avoidance goal: present vs. absent) between subjects
factorial design. One hundred fifty-two undergraduate students were recruited from a
public, southern U.S. university to participate in this experiment in exchange for partial
course credit (Mage=22.37 years, SD=4.58; males=75 and females=77). A total of seven
individuals were later excluded from the analyses as they either failed the manipulation
check or they did not finish the survey completely. Subjects completed an online survey
and were randomly assigned to one of four possible scenarios. The first three pages of the
study were common to all conditions. They described the purpose of the study and asked
for consent to participate in it. The scenario asked subjects to imagine that they would be
spending a day at an event that featured international food. Then, participants were told
that they decided to purchase a snack from one of the nearby food kiosks and were
offered sixteen snack options. Eight snacks in the list were unhealthy (chocolate bar,
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Chips Ahoy cookies, cheese curls, Doritos chips, ice cream, doughnuts, Oreos, and fruit
roll-ups) and the remainder eight snacks were healthy (raisins, celery sticks, cheerios, low
fat yogurt, baby carrots, granola bar, rice cake, and apple). The list of snacks was adopted
from Laran (2010). Participants were asked to choose only one snack from the list. The
target decisions were about whether they chose a healthy (virtue) or unhealthy (vice)
option and how much they are willing to pay for their selected snack. The scenario for the
no prepayment conditions without priming the consumption avoidance goal was as
follows. Please note that the words in the brackets denote the conditions to which the
participants were randomly assigned.

“Imagine that you are at Disney’s Food & Wine Festival. This annual
autumn event features international kiosks offering a variety of tasty
appetizers and refreshing beverages. The admission to this event is free
[$10]. At the event, you decide to buy a snack from one of the nearby
kiosks. Please choose the snack you would like to have from the list on the
next page.”

The key difference in the avoidance goal manipulation was that people who were
primed with the consumption avoidance goal were asked to consider and document the
reasons to avoid engaging in consumption behavior prior to reading the main scenario. In
particular, we told subjects the following: “Often times, people feel like wanting TO
AVOID EATING snacks. Can you please list below the reasons that come to your mind
that make you want TO AVOID EATING snacks?” Underneath this statement, there was
a box that participants were able to list their thoughts. Those for whom the consumption
avoidance goal was absent only saw the main scenario.
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After participants indicated their snack choice and the amount they were willing
to pay, we asked them to write down their rationale for their snack choice. We
specifically asked them to be as detailed as possible when reflecting their thoughts. Based
on the mental accounting theory (Thaler, 1980), a mental account helps a decision maker
to focus on the most salient goal. When the consumption avoidance goal is not primed,
people’s attention is mainly drawn to the prepayment sunk cost. As such, individuals may
choose vice over virtue and spend frivolously to overcome the negative emotions elicited
from prepayment. Alternatively, when the consumption avoidance goal is made salient,
we expect the participant to stay focused on goals that encourage them to avoid
consumption. In other words, they use the open mental budget dedicated to prepayment
as the regulating mechanism to achieve their avoidance goal (Krishnamurthy and
Prokopec, 2010). Thus, when the consumption avoidance goal is absent, the prepayment
should lead to an increase in thoughts concerned with the sunk cost. In contrast, when the
consumption avoidance goal is made salient, the prepayment should increase the
incidence of health-related thoughts.
In the last page of the survey, we asked participants to answer manipulation check
questions and to rate the believability of the scenario, their level of involvement, and their
healthy eating habits. We also recorded participants’ gender and level of hunger while
taking the survey.

2.7.2 Independent variables
2.7.2.1 Prepayment. All participants first read a short description in which
they were told that they had attended an international food festival. In the prepayment
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condition, participants were told that the admission fee to this event was $10. However,
in the no prepayment conditions, subjects were informed that the admission to this event
was free. Thus, we initiated a mental account by telling one group of participants that the
cost of admission to an event was $10. We assume that people would choose more vice
(unhealthy) snacks to justify the cost of the prepayment. Alternatively, participants in the
no prepayment condition did not incur any admission cost and, consequently, their snack
choices should not be driven by the negative utility of the prepayment.

2.7.2.2 Consumption avoidance goal. A consumption avoidance goal similar
to Krishnamurthy and Prokopec (2010) was primed by asking one group of participants
to consider and write down reasons to avoid eating snacks. In the case where the
consumption avoidance goal was absent, subjects did not see the above statements and
were immediately directed to the main prepayment scenario.

2.7.3 Dependent variables
2.7.3.1 Choice of snack. Participants selected a snack from a list of sixteen

snacks developed by Laran (2010). Half of snacks were unhealthy, whereas the other half
were healthy. We pretested this list with a group of undergraduate students (n=17). Our
results indicated that the snacks, on average, were equally preferred (Mhealthy=4.58 vs.
Munhealthy=4.71; F <1). In addition, the group of healthy and unhealthy snacks served their
purpose properly, measured on a 7-point (1=very unhealthy and 7=very healthy) semantic
differential scale (Mhealthy=4.92 vs. Munhealthy=2.64; F (1, 16) =85.32, p<.05). Participants
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were asked to only choose one snack. This choice could have one of two possible values,
indicating whether the snack was healthy (coded 0) or unhealthy (coded 1).

2.7.3.2 Willingness to pay. After participants indicated their snack choice,
they were asked how much they were willing to pay for their snack. Findings from the
same pretest indicated that the cost of healthy snacks, on average, were estimated to be
about the same as the unhealthy snacks (Mhealthy=$2.31 vs. Munhealthy=$3.01; F (1, 16)
=3.67, p>.05).

2.7.4 Process evidence. To gain additional insight into the process leading to
overspending and indulgence after people prepay, we analyzed the cognitive responses
(i.e., the comments that respondents wrote about their thought process after they chose
their snack in the survey). Each reason in the thought protocol was coded as being healthfocused, pleasure-focused, or sunk cost-focused. Our prediction is that overspending and
indulgent consumption (e.g., choosing vice over virtue) is based on the logic that mental
accounting assists individuals in pursuing the most salient goal (Krishnamurthy and
Prokopec, 2010). If this is true, when the consumption avoidance goal is absent, we
predict that people who prepay would report more thoughts pertinent to the sunk cost
than people who do not prepay. This is because they want to close the mental account
dedicated to the prepayment by actively choosing snack options that elicit positive
emotions. Conversely, when the consumption avoidance goal is activated, people who
make a prepayment are more inclined to refer to health-related thoughts than people who
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do not prepay. We believe this happens because the mental account assigned to the
prepayment will assist individuals to focus on the pursuit of the most salient goal which
is consumption avoidance.

2.7.5 Covariates. We measured healthy eating habits by averaging five 7-point
Likert or semantic differential scales developed by Krishnamurthy and Prokopec (2010)
that measured whether participants watched what they ate (disagree/agree), the
importance they gave to eating healthy (not at all important/very important), whether they
were on a diet (not on a diet/on a diet), their consumption of fruits/veggies (eat less of/eat
more of), and the extent to which they tried to choose low-calorie foods (disagree/agree).
These items were found to be highly reliable (Cronbach’s alpha=.91). Additionally, we
controlled for participants’ gender, hunger during the survey, and their level of
involvement with the scenario. Feeling of hunger was measured on a 7-point semantic
differential scale by asking respondents to indicate to what extent they were hungry while
taking the survey (not at all hungry/very hungry). The level of involvement with the task
was also measured by averaging four 7-point semantic differential scales adopted from
Wang and Calder (2006). These items were also found to be highly reliable (Cronbach’s
alpha=.89). However, only the healthy eating measure and gender revealed a significant
influence and were controlled for in subsequent analyses.
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2.7.6 Results
2.7.6.1 Manipulation check. We assessed the success of the manipulation of
the prepayment and the consumption avoidance conditions with two questions at the end
of the survey. First, we asked people in a multiple-choice question to select the amount
that they paid to enter the festival. As was expected, people in the no prepayment
condition chose the “free admission” option, whereas all subjects, except two, in the
prepayment condition chose the “$10 admission fee” option. Second, the effectiveness of
the avoidance goal priming was measured by comparing the proportion of pleasurefocused thoughts generated by each group across prepayment conditions. Individuals in
the salient consumption avoidance goal reported a significantly less number of pleasurefocused concerns than did subjects when consumption avoidance goal was absent
(M=0.12 vs. M=.28, F (1, 139) =6.31, p<.05). Therefore, we concluded that the priming
of the avoidance goal was successful. Since no one correctly guessed the purpose of the
study, responses from a total of 143 subjects, who met the above criteria, were used for
further analyses.

2.7.6.2 Support for H1and H2. A two-way analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) was performed with two levels of monetary prepayment (present vs. absent)
crossed with two levels of the consumption avoidance mechanism (present vs. absent) as
between-subjects independent variables. The dependent variable was the amount that
people reported they were willing to pay for their snack. Healthy eating habits and gender
were also entered as covariates in the model.
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Our results demonstrated a significant main effect of prepayment (F (1, 139)
=7.67, p<.05) such that those who prepaid for the event were willing to spend more on
their desired snack (M=$4.03) when compared to those who entered the event for free
(M=$3.34). However, no significant main effect of the consumption avoidance goal on
the willingness to pay was observed. This means that a willingness to pay for the snack
did not significantly differ between people who were primed with the consumption
avoidance goal (M=$3.62) and individuals who were not (M=$3.75; F (1, 139) =1.26,
p>.05). In addition, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction. The
avoidance goal and prepayment interaction (F (1, 139) =22.35, p<.05) confirmed that a
willingness to pay difference between the prepayment conditions was significantly
greater when the avoidance goal was absent (M=$2.13) than it was present (M=$.56).
Planned contrasts revealed a significant increase in a willingness to pay for the
snack when the consumption avoidance goal was absent such that willingness to pay was
higher (F (1, 68) =32.04, p<.05) when people prepaid to enter the event (M=$5.06)
compared to when they did not (M=$2.93). This finding supports H1 and H2 when
overspending is considers as a proxy to temptation. As such, when the avoidance aspect
of the behavior was not primed, people who prepaid toward a consumption goal were
more likely to spend than people who did not prepay. However, when the avoidance
aspect of behavior was activated, the difference in willingness to spend on the snack
choice between two prepayment conditions disappeared (Mprepayment=$3.40 vs. Mnoprepayment=$3.96;

F (1, 71) =1.73, p=.19>.05). Figure 4 depicts the above results.

To examine the loss of self-control in the context of snack choice, a logistic
regression analysis was performed with the monetary prepayment (present vs. absent) and
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the consumption avoidance mechanism (present vs. absent) as predictors. The dependent
variable was the binary choice between an unhealthy or healthy type of snack. Similar to
the ANCOVA analysis, healthy eating habits, gender, task involvement, and hunger
during the survey were added to the model as control variables.

Figure 4. The influence of prepayment and avoidance goal on willingness to spend on a
snack
A logistic regression analysis indicated a significant prepayment by avoidance
goal interaction (Wald=13.61, p<.05), in addition to a significant main effect of the
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consumption avoidance goal (Wald=10.55, p<.05). In support of H1 and H2, when the
consumption avoidance goal was absent, making a prepayment toward a consumption
goal resulted in an increase in the choice of the unhealthy snack (85.20% when the
prepayment was made compared to 41.90% when there was no prepayment; z=3.58, p
<05).

Figure 5. The influence of prepayment and avoidance goal on preference for an
unhealthy snack
Moreover, when the prepayment was made, the preference for the unhealthy
snack was higher when the avoidance goal was absent (85.20%) than when it was present
(36.40%; z=4.01, p<.05). However, when no prepayment was made to enter the festival,
the preference for the unhealthy snack did not significantly vary across the two avoidance
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goal conditions (41.90% vs. 48.30% in the absence and presence of the avoidance goal
conditions, respectively; z<1, p=.59>.05). Figure 5 illustrates these results.

2.7.6.3 Process evidence. Following the thought protocol procedure discussed
earlier, we classified the cognitive responses of individuals regarding their snack
selection into health-focused (e.g., “I am very careful about what I eat”) and pleasurefocused (e.g., “I love ice cream. This is the best option in a food festival.”), or sunk costfocused (e.g., “I paid to get in so why not treat myself to a yummy snack?”) thoughts.
Then, we carried out three separate ANOVAs to evaluate how the number of healthrelated, pleasure-related and sunk-cost related thoughts varied across the prepayment and
avoidance goal conditions.
With respect to the incidence of health-focused thoughts, a significant main effect
of the consumption avoidance goal (M=0.64 vs. M=.31, F (1, 139) =11.55, p<.05) as well
as a two-way interaction between the prepayment and the consumption avoidance goal (F
(1, 139) =12.62, p<.05) was observed. Planned contrast showed that when the
consumption avoidance goal was absent, there was no difference between the prepayment
and no-prepayment condition in terms of the number of health-related thoughts
(Mprepayment=.26 vs. Mno-prepayment=.37; F (1, 68) <1). However, when the consumption
avoidance goal was present, those who prepaid for an event reported a significantly
higher number of health-related thoughts than those who did not prepay
(Mprepayment=.83vs. Mno-prepayment=.46; F (1, 71) =5.73, p<.05). This finding supports our
assumption that a mental account will assist individuals to pursue the most salient goal.
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When we analyzed the number of sunk cost thoughts, we observed a significant
main effect of prepayment (Mprepayment=.61vs. Mno-prepayment=.25; F (1, 139) =5.69, p<.05),
as well as a two-way interaction between the prepayment and the avoidance goal (F (1,
139) =12.62, p<.05). Particularly, a planned contrast indicated that within the
consumption avoidance salient condition, there was no difference between the
prepayment and no-prepayment condition in terms of the number of sunk cost-related
thoughts (Mprepayment=.32 vs. Mno-prepayment=.26; F (1, 71) <1). However, when the
consumption avoidance goal was absent, those who prepaid for an event reported a
significantly higher number of sunk cost-focused thoughts than those who did not prepay
(Mprepayment=.83 vs. Mno-prepayment=.34; F (1, 68) =7.41, p<.05).
Our analysis for the incidence of pleasure-focused thoughts only revealed a
significant main effect of avoidance goal conditions. That is, individuals in the salient
consumption avoidance goal reported a significantly a fewer number of pleasure-focused
concerns than did subjects when consumption avoidance goal was absent (M=0.12 vs.
M=.28, F (1, 139) =6.31, p<.05). Planned contrasts showed that no difference between
the prepayment and no-prepayment condition in terms of the number of pleasure-related
thoughts in the presence of avoidance goal (Mprepayment=.31 vs. Mno-prepayment=.26; F (1, 71)
<1) and the absence of avoidance goal existed (Mprepayment=.11 vs. Mno-prepayment=.14; F (1,
68) <1).
In summary, we concluded that the cost of prepayment increased people’s
propensity to choose unhealthier snacks when the consumption avoidance goal was not
primed. However, when the avoidance goal was activated, the tendency toward choosing
an unhealthy snack disappeared.
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2.7.7 Discussion. Results from the first study lend support to H1 and H2. More
specifically, we demonstrated that when the avoidance aspect of consumption behavior
was absent, individuals who prepaid had a higher tendency to indulge (e.g., choosing vice
over virtue) and overspend than those who did not make a prepayment. While mental
accounting generally works as a reference point to regulate consumption behavior
(Soman, 2001; Thaler, 1985), our findings indicate that mental accounting, dedicated to
the cost of prepayment, resulted in indulgent consumption and spending decisions. Our
thought protocols revealed that the sunk costs of prepayment caused this anomaly.
Participants sought immediate rewards after prepayment to feel satisfied in order to close
their mental accounts. This result is consistent with the finding by Fishbach and Labroo
(2007) that adding a psychological gain is one way that consumers can suppress the
negative utility of an action.
Further, our results showed that priming individuals with an avoidance goal
significantly enhanced their self-control in consumption. We found that when a
prepayment coincided with an avoidance goal, individuals were better able to monitor
their consumption and spending behavior. This finding reflects the role of mental
accounting in helping decision makers to stay focused on their salient goals
(Krishnamurthy and Prokopec, 2010). That is, a prepayment did not create a deviation
from normal consumption behavior; rather, it facilitated individuals’ pursuit of the
avoidance goal. As a result, individuals reported a significantly higher number of healthfocused thoughts when the consumption avoidance goal was present than did those
subjects where consumption avoidance goal was absent.
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In Study 1, we argued that prepayment and the saliency of the avoidance goal
influenced consumption and spending behavior. In Study 2, however, we explore other
factors that moderate the influence of prepayment on indulgent consumption. More
specifically, we investigate whether different types of prepayment (e.g., temporal, effortbased, and monetary) and the anticipation of the prepayment would influence people’
consumption decision. In addition, we reproduce the mediating role of sunk cost thoughts
generated from prepayment on indulgent consumption by measuring the pain of payment.

2.8 Experiment 2

Experiment 1 only focused on monetary prepayment. However, experiment 2
examines the prediction that people often prepay with other currencies and they may treat
a non-monetary prepayment differently than a monetary prepayment. In particular, this
study examines whether the sunk cost effect of monetary and non-monetary (e.g., in the
form of time or effort) prepayments varies as a function of individuals’ anticipation of the
prepayment. When a prepayment is unanticipated, a behavioral prepayment shifts
people’s preference more toward indulgent (vice) choices than a monetary prepayment
does. This prediction is based on the notion of de-escalation of commitment that only
occurs to monetary prepayments. Conversely, when a prepayment is anticipated, we
expect the difference between monetary and non-monetary prepayment for indulgent
consumption to flip. We propose that this reversal effect occurs because when both
monetary and non-monetary prepayments are anticipated, they are subject to escalation of
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commitment. The pain of payment is discussed as the underlying process leading to
indulgent behavior and, especially, the proposed difference among three sources of
prepayment.

2.8.1 Pretests. The experiment involved scenarios in which people imagined
prepaying with different currencies, namely money, time, and effort. We carried out
several pretests to ensure equivalence of these resources. First, we told a group of
undergraduate students (n=19) to imagine they had left their IDs in a car parked four
blocks from a club that they wanted to enter. Then, they decided to pay a valet staff to go
and get their IDs from the car. We asked subjects to indicate how much they were willing
to pay the valet staff for his effort (M=$11.46, SD=1.82). This value was found to be not
significantly different than $12 used in the next pretest (t (1, 18) =.12, p>.05).
Another group of undergraduate students (n=20) imagined they had gone to a club
that was free for individuals who waited in line, but it charged $12 VIP for immediate
admission. Participants were asked to indicate how long they were willing to wait in line
to avoid paying $12 cover charge (M=47.64 minutes, SD= 12.05). Again, this value was
shown to be not significantly different than 50 minutes (t (1, 19) =.84, p>.05). Finally, we
confirmed the conversion rate among three prepayment currencies by asking another
group of students (n=17) to estimate how much a valet parking staff makes per hour
(M=$15.2, SD=2.23). This value did not significantly differ from $12 for 50 minutes of
service (t (1, 16) =.73, p>.05). Based on the results of these pretests, we created our
experiment scenarios in the context of a service provider such that the equivalent
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prepayments with money ($12), time (50 minutes), and effort (walk eight blocks) would
be applicable.

2.8.2 Design, participants, and procedure. This experiment is a 3 (prepayment
currency: money vs. time vs. effort) x 2 (prepayment: anticipated vs. unanticipated)
between subject factorial design with an additional control condition. Two hundred seven
undergraduate students from the same university participated in this experiment in
exchange for partial course credit (Mage=21.52 years, SD=4.17; males=99 and
females=97). A total of eleven responses were deleted from further analyses as they
either failed the manipulation checks or they were incomplete. Unlike the treatment
conditions, the control group participants were exposed to neither the prepayment nor the
anticipation of prepayment manipulation information. The rationale for adding this
control group was to examine whether prepayment in any format would result in
indulgent consumption.
An online survey with seven scenarios (one for the control group and six for the
treatment conditions) was created and respondents were randomly assigned to one of the
conditions. The first three pages of the study were common to all conditions. They
described the purpose of the study and asked subjects for their consent to participate in it.
Next, participants imagined that they were going to a popular restaurant. In a between
subject design, subjects were informed that due to high demand, they had to pay an
admission fee ($12), wait in line (50 minutes), or make a certain effort (walk eight
blocks) to enter the restaurant. In addition, the prepayment information was conveyed
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such that it gave participants the impression that prepayment was either anticipated or
unanticipated. Then, participants imagined that they entered the restaurant and decided to
order. In particular, unlike Study 1 where we provided the snack choices, we asked
participants to write down the appetizers they would like to order. We were interested to
assess whether subjects’ preference (healthy vs. unhealthy dessert) and the degree of
willingness to pay varied across experiment conditions. For example, the scenario for the
anticipated monetary prepayment was as follows. Please note that the underlined
statements changed depending upon the conditions to which the participants were
randomly assigned. More details for the wording of all treatment scenarios are available
in Appendix 1.

“Imagine that you go to your favorite restaurant on a Saturday night. The
restaurant charges a $12 admission fee as it is Oktoberfest. Oktoberfest is
an international beer festival running from late September to the first
weekend in October. Before selecting this place, you expected the cover
charge, so you were not surprised when you were asked to pay the
admission fee. After you get into the restaurant, you find out that it serves
a variety of appetizers. Please list the appetizers that you would like to
order on the next page.”

Individuals in the no-treatment control condition read the following scenario:

“Imagine that you go to your favorite restaurant on a Saturday night in
Oktoberfest. Oktoberfest is an international beer festival running from late
September to the first weekend in October. After you get into the
restaurant, you find out that it serves a variety of appetizers. Please list
the appetizers that you would like to order.”
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After participants indicated their orders and the amount they were willing to pay,
we measured participants’ negative feelings toward the prepayment (e.g., pain of
payment) as the mediator. In particular, we were interested in investigating whether the
pain of payment (Thomas et al., 2011) mediated the interaction of the type of prepayment
and anticipation on indulgent choice. Finally, we collected responses pertaining to the
success of the manipulation of independent variables, the level of involvement, healthy
eating habits, gender, and the level of hunger in the experiment.

2.8.3 Independent variables.
2.8.3.1 Prepayment currency. All participants first read a short description in
which they were told that they went to a popular restaurant on a Saturday night.
Prepayment currency was manipulated at three levels: money, time, and effort. The
prepayment values were pretested to ascertain they were perceived to be equal. Under the
monetary prepayment treatment, participants imagined that they paid a $12 admission fee
to enter the restaurant. When the prepayment was intended to be in time currency,
subjects imagined that they had waited in line for 50 minutes before they entered the
restaurant. Finally, in the prepayment condition with effort, subjects were informed that
they walked eight blocks before they entered the restaurant.
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2.8.3.2 Prepayment Anticipation. This factor was manipulated at two levels.
When the prepayment anticipation was present, the scenario informed participants that
the prepayment for the restaurant, regardless of the type, was something expected and it
took place without any surprises. Conversely, when the prepayment was unanticipated in
the scenario, participants were told that they were surprised because they were not
expecting a prepayment for the restaurant.
Besides these two independent variables, a control group was also added to the
experiment in that we manipulated neither the prepayment nor the anticipation of
prepayment. This control condition allowed us to investigate the significant role of
prepayment, irrespective of type, on indulging behavior. We did this by contrasting the
effects of prepayment treatments to those of the control condition.

2.8.4 Dependent variable. In Study 1, the loss of self-control was measured via
overspending and indulgent choices. In this study, we use an alternative method to
measure loss of self-control (see Laran, 2010 for details). In particular, after participants
read the prepayment scenario, they were given a minute to think about and write down
the names of the appetizers they wanted to order at the restaurant. Two judges coded the
responses and categorized the listed appetizer(s) by each participant into healthy/virtue
(e.g., “salad,” “spinach dip”) or unhealthy/vice (e.g., “French fries,” “calamari”). The
definition of vice (unhealthy) and virtue (healthy) were adopted from Khan and Dhar
(2007). Vice was defined as “something tempting that may have fewer long-term
benefits. It is something that you want, but at the same time feel more guilty choosing.”
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Similarly, virtue was defined as “something that is not very tempting now, but may be
more beneficial in the long run. It is something that you feel less guilty choosing.” Then,
a value of zero (or one) was assigned when a given participant listed healthier than
unhealthy appetizers. The inter-judge reliability was approximately 81% and
inconsistencies were resolved through discussion.

2.8.5 Process evidence. We present the pain of payment as the underlying
mechanism for the effect of prepayments with different currencies on indulgent
consumption. This construct measured the intensity of the negative feelings that
participants experienced after they made the prepayment. In particular, we used the scale
developed by Thomas et al. (2011) that asked participants how they felt about paying
before entering the restaurant. The pain of payment was measured via using a nonverbal
faces scale. Specifically, participants responded to the following question: “Different
factors may influence how consumers feel about their service experience. How did you
feel about the wait time {admission fee/eight blocks walk} for this restaurant?” Words in
the brackets denote the prepayment conditions. Participants indicated their responses on a
7-point nonverbal faces pain scale with a happy face (☺) at the lower end of the scale and
a sad face () at the higher end of the scale. For each participant, we determined the
intensity of the pain of payment (i.e., negative emotion experienced after payment) by
quantifying the response to the nonverbal pain scale.

2.8.6 Covariates. Similar to Study 1, we controlled for the effect of healthy
eating habits, gender, involvement, and hunger during the survey. Of these measures,
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healthy eating habit demonstrated the most influence and was retained in subsequent
analyses.

2.8.7 Results
2.8.7.1 Manipulation check. We qualified the success of the manipulation of
independent variables with two questions at the end of the survey. First, we asked people
in a multiple-choice question to select the amount that they paid, the time they spent, and
the effort they made to enter the club. As expected, all subjects, except two, selected
choices consistent with their experiment conditions. Second, we asked subjects to
indicate to what extent the incurred prepayment was anticipated on a 7-point semantic
differential scale (1=completely unanticipated and 7=completely anticipated). As
expected, participants in the prepayment anticipation group rated the anticipation of the
prepayment significantly higher than did individuals in non-anticipation condition
(Manticipation=5.88 vs. Mnon-anticipation=2.63; F (1, 135)=28.12, p<.05). Since no one correctly
guessed the purpose of the study, responses from a total of 136 subjects, who met the
above criteria, were used for further analyses.

2.8.7.2 Choice of appetizers. A logistic regression analysis is used to test the
influence of prepayment method (money vs. time vs. effort) and prepayment anticipation
(anticipated vs. unanticipated) on the choice of unhealthy (vice) appetizers. Since the
prepayment method included three conditions, we created two dummy variables with the
monetary prepayment as the base level. Therefore, the logistic regression model consisted
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of three main effects (i.e., anticipation, time, and effort dummies) and two interaction
terms between prepayment conditions and anticipation dummy correspondingly. Our
results indicate that the significant main effect of anticipation (Wald=9.37, p<.05) was
qualified with two significant interactions between the effort-based prepayment and
anticipation (Wald= 5.08, p<.05) and the time-based prepayment and anticipation (Wald=
6.92, p<.05). Planned contrasts revealed that when prepayment was anticipated,
participants were more willing to choose unhealthy desserts when they made monetary
prepayment compared to time-based prepayment (75.9% vs. 57.1%; z =2.01, p<.05) and
effort-based prepayment (75.9% vs. 51.7%; z =2.63, p<.05). The choice of appetizer(s),
however, did not significantly differ between behavioral prepayments (z<1, p>.05). These
findings support H3a and H3b as the indulgent consumption caused by prepayment is
greater for anticipated monetary than anticipated non-monetary prepayment.
Conversely, when prepayment was unanticipated, the pattern of preference for
unhealthy appetizers reversed among prepayment conditions. More specifically, in the
unanticipated prepayment condition, participants had a higher propensity to choose
unhealthy appetizer(s) when they prepaid with time (57.7%) than when they prepaid with
equivalent money (34.5%; z = 2.55, p<.05). The difference in choice shares was also
significant when effort compared to effort-equivalent money was used as the prepayment
method (59.3% vs. 34.5%; z = 2.68, p<.05). However, no significant difference was
found for choice shares of unhealthy appetizers between time-based and effort-based
prepayments (z<1, p>.05). Hence, H4a and H4b, which state that hedonic consumption as
a result of the sunk cost effect increases when unanticipated behavioral prepayments
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compared to unanticipated monetary prepayment occur. Choice shares for unhealthy
appetizers are presented in Figure 6.
To further explore the overall effect of prepayment on indulgent choice, we
contrasted the experimental groups with the control group using independent z tests. This
test was chosen because we wanted to compare the choice shares across experiment
conditions. Our results confirmed that monetary prepayment, when compared to the no
prepayment scenario, enhanced temptation only when the prepayment was anticipated. In
particular, the choice share of unhealthy appetizer(s) for anticipated monetary
prepayment was significantly greater than that of the control group (75.9% vs. 36.1%;
z=3.03, p<.05).
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Figure 6. The influence of prepayment currency and anticipation on preference for an
unhealthy appetizer
However, the sunk cost effect for behavioral prepayments (e.g., excessive hedonic
consumption) did not vary significantly as a function of anticipation conditions. That is,
the choice of unhealthy appetizer(s) for time-based (57.4%) and effort-based
prepayments (55.4%) were both greater than that of the control group (36.1%; z=2.17,
p<.05 and z=2.03, p<.05, correspondingly).

2.8.7.3 Process evidence. We carried out a mediated moderation analysis to
test to what extent the pain of prepayment predicted the preference for unhealthy
appetizer(s). This analysis included a series of regression models to examine H5, stating
that the effect of the interaction between prepayment methods and anticipation on
unhealthy appetizer preference was mediated by the pain of payment. We followed the
steps outlined by Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005) for the mediated moderation test.
First, the interaction between the time prepayment dummy and prepayment anticipation
predicted the pain of payment (F (1, 162) =14.31, p<.05), as did the interaction between
the effort prepayment dummy and prepayment anticipation (F (1, 162) =10.95, p<.05).
Additionally, these interactions were significant predictors of the preference for
unhealthy appetizers (time: Wald= 5.08, p<.05; effort: Wald= 6.92, p<.05). Moreover, the
pain of prepayment significantly influenced the preference for unhealthy appetizers
(Wald=9.03, p<.05). However, when the pain of prepayment and the interaction of the
prepayment dummies and anticipation simultaneously predicted the preference for
unhealthy appetizers, the pain of prepayment remained significant (Wald=6.96, p<.05),
while the interactions both turned insignificant (Wald<2, p>.05). These results
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collectively indicate that the effect of the interaction of prepayment currency and
anticipation on the preference for unhealthy appetizers is fully mediated by the pain of
prepayment. Therefore, we support H5.

2.8.8 Discussion. This study explored the role of prepayment anticipation and
prepayment currency (e.g., money, time, or effort) on indulgent behavior. Due to
difference in mental accounting and the distinct nature of time/effort and money, we
demonstrated that the anticipation of prepayment was a determinant factor in establishing
the sunk cost effect. In particular, our results indicated that the magnitude of the sunk
cost effect for monetary prepayment depends upon the anticipation of such investment.
More specifically, when a monetary prepayment was anticipated, people indicated a
strong sunk cost effect as represented in the form of hedonic (unhealthy) consumption.
Anticipation of prepayment assisted consumers in setting a budget for their spending and
accelerated consumption toward the budgeted limit by justifying it as a license to
consume (Khan and Dhar, 2006). Since mental accounts are largely formed for monetary
investments (Soman, 2001) and people keep track of their money more than other
behavioral resources, more indulgent (vice) choices were observed for prepayments made
with money than those made with other money-equivalent behavioral resources. This
finding is in line with the existing literature in that the magnitude of the sunk cost
decreases from monetary to non-monetary investments (Monga and Saini, 2009; Navarro
and Fantino, 2009).
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However, an opposite pattern for sunk cost effects was observed when
prepayments were unanticipated. As such, people who prepaid with money were less
likely to yield to temptation than people who prepaid with behavioral resources that were
comparable to that money. We attribute this observation to the notion of de-escalation of
commitment (Heath, 1995). According to this concept, a “reverse sunk cost effect”
occurs when an investment exceeds the mental budget limit and it is easy to be tracked.
This finding addresses the future research inquiry set forth by Krishnamurthy and
Prokopec (2010) indicating that “it would be worthwhile to examine the possible effects
of exceeding the limit of a mental budget on subsequent behavior”. Although
unanticipated monetary investments were susceptible to a de-escalation of commitment,
behavioral investments, due to the difficulties in setting up and being traced in mental
budgets, were immune from the de-escalation of commitment. We introduced the pain of
prepayment as the mediator for the interactive impact of prepayment and anticipation on
indulgent behavior.

2.9 General Discussion and Conclusion

Consumers encounter self-control conflicts in everyday life. As such, they need to
choose between immediate versus delayed gratification. One of the suggested methods
that aids self-control and impedes immediate indulgence is the use of mental accounts
(Thaler, 1985; Heath and Soll, 1996). Mental accounting sets self-specified allowances to
curb consumption and spending habits (Soman, 2001; Krishnamurthy and Prokopec,
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2010). In this research, we explore certain circumstances under which mental accounting
rules can encourage, as opposed to discourage, indulgence. More specifically, we look
into the role of prepayment toward a consumption goal and its influence on money
spending and food choice. Prepayment before a consumption decision occurs in
numerous contexts and may provide justification for consuming and spending
irrationally.
Our findings in Study 1 suggested that when people were not primed with the
consumption avoidance goal, those who prepaid toward the consumption goal (e.g., food
consumption at a food festival) had a higher tendency to choose an unhealthy snack and
overspend. Thought protocols identified the sunk cost of prepayment as the underlying
justification to indulge. However, the anomaly in food preference and spending
disappeared when people had access to the avoidance goals. This means that individuals
who prepaid with the saliency of the avoidance goal were better in regulating their
consumption and expenditures than those who prepaid without it. In addition, Study 2
extended the notion of prepayment to currencies other than money, namely time and
effort. Consistent with the existing literature, our findings indicated that the magnitude of
the sunk cost effect (i.e., the irrational behavior caused by the sunk cost) decreased when
prepayments were made with time or effort. However, we found that when the
prepayment was unanticipated, time and effort had a bigger effect on indulgent
consumption than money did. We associated this interesting finding to the difference
between the mental accounting of time/effort and money. Pain of prepayment served a
mediating role for the interactive impact of prepayment and anticipation on indulgent
behavior.
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2.9.1 Theoretical implications. Our findings add to the existing literature on
mental accounting in the following ways. First, mental accounting is known to be an
effective method to regulate behavior that has been demonstrated in the context of
consumption and spending behavior (Thaler, 1985; Soman, 2001). Consumers who open
a mental account are able to exercise self-control effectively in their decisions. However,
our research indicates that the restrictive role of mental accounting on consumption and
spending will be attenuated when consumers make a prepayment toward a consumption
goal (e.g., $5 convenience fee to reserve a table at a restaurant). We support our argument
for sunk cost effect with reason-based choice theory (Shafir et al., 1993) and affective
restoration model (Tice et al., 2001). Akin to Kivetz’s (1999) proposition, we suggest that
justification may violate mental accounting rules. We believe decision makers, upon
making a prepayment, experience an immediate need to justify the prior investment to
avoid considering it as wasteful. To put it differently, we find prepayment to be a
mechanism that makes people precommit to indulge (Kivetz and Simonson, 2002).
Additionally, while prior research suggests that sunk costs effects for time or
effort investments do not exist (Soman, 2001) or are weaker than those for money
investments (Navarro and Fantino, 2009), our paper confirms that these findings only
hold when investments (i.e., in our case prepayments) are anticipated. That is, when an
investment toward a goal is anticipated, a mental budget is adjusted such that it would
accommodate the cost of investment. As a result, an anticipated prepayment would fit
within the limits of the dedicated mental budget and an escalation of commitment would
occur (Heath, 1995). However, we find that when an unanticipated prepayment takes
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place, the direction for the magnitude of sunk cost effects for monetary and non-monetary
investments reverses. This counterintuitive finding is based on the notion of de-escalation
of commitment (Heath, 1995): “an investment that exceeds the mental budget limit and is
easy to track produces a reverse sunk cost effect”. Since people keep track of their
financial investments and consider opportunity costs of their money more readily than
they do for non-monetary investments such as time and effort, we only found the reverse
sunk cost effect for the monetary prepayment. Hence, an unanticipated non-monetary
prepayment resulted in higher temptation than an equivalent unanticipated monetary
prepayment.

2.9.2 Managerial implications. The results of our study may be fruitful for
marketers in different ways. First, despite the fast growth and significant prominence of
social coupons (e.g., coupons in the form of online daily offers), many practitioners are
still doubtful about the profitability of this marketing tool for business owners (Kumar
and Rajan, 2012). The reason is that coupon sites such as Groupon and LivingSocial
typically take away half of the coupon value as their fees and customer retention after the
coupon redemption phase is very difficult (Sherr, 2010). As a result, a lot of small/local
businesses recently stopped paying premium prices to social couponing websites such as
Groupon. Our findings regarding the increase in customers’ temptation after monetary
prepayment have imperative applications in this context. In particular, business owners
should not merely focus on the forgone profit of promoting their services and/or products
on social coupon websites. Rather, they should count on the potential profit margins due
to consumers’ tendency to overspend and indulge after the coupon is redeemed. Since our
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results suggest the pain of prepayment is the underlying mechanism that justifies
indulgent decisions, marketers are better off to advertise coupons with high face values to
target hedonic (vice) services. This idea, especially, is relevant to individuals with
hyperopia who need to commit themselves to indulge (Kivetz and Simonson, 2002). This
suggestion seems to have started taking place in the market. For example, the average
discount per social coupon was 53% and people, on average, prepaid $38.04 per social
coupon in the fourth quarter of 2010. However, in the first quarter of 2011, the average
price per social coupon reached $42.45 and most of deals were promoting luxury and
other high end goods and services (Rueter, 2011).
Additionally, the notion that behavioral prepayment induces temptation can be
effectively employed in practice. Behavioral resources (e.g., time and effort) are more
scarce and perishable than equivalent money (Mogilner and Aaker, 2009). Therefore,
when expended, they can justify and create less guilt for indulgence (Kivetz and Zheng,
2006). Marketers should promote their services/products as a reward with respect to time
and/or effort consumers invested prior to the actual consumption. The immediate reward
for behavioral prepayment may give an entitlement (“I deserve this product because I
worked hard for it”) to select indulgent choices. For example, Burger King just recently
launched "Whopper Lust," which was a commercial that was aired exclusively on
Channel 111 on DirecTV. The commercial displayed a Whopper continually spinning on
top of a flaming grill. The commercial randomly displayed prompts asking viewers to
click a certain button on their remote control to ensure viewers were paying attention. If
people could watch the commercial for five minutes, they got a free Whopper. After five
minutes elapse, viewers either selected to have a free Whopper mailed to their house or
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they continued to watch the spinning Whopper. For each additional five minutes people
watched the commercial, they earned a free Whopper. According to Burger King’s
advertising agency, this campaign was designed to remind consumers about the time and
mental effort they invested to earn their coupons. Therefore, the company expected
consumers to rush to the closest Burger King branch to redeem their coupons and,
hopefully, spend more.

2.9.3 Directions for future research. One of the best applications for the
findings of this research is social coupons. A social coupon is a steep discount that is
available in limited quantities for a limited amount of time. Consumers typically pay to
buy a coupon that can be redeemed in future. However, the current research did not
explore the impact of the timing of the redemption on consumers’ temptation. This issue
is important because some social coupons run by dates, whereas others only become
available for redemption after a certain period. Future research should examine whether
the framing of the time lag between the prepayment and the redemption may influence
people’s tendency to overspend and indulge. Although, the depreciation of the cost of
prepayment over time should intuitively attenuate the sunk cost effect (Soman, 1998),
research on sales promotion suggests that the presence of a restriction (i.e., purchase or
time limit) draws individuals attention to the value of the deal (Inman et al., 1997).
Therefore, the cost of social coupon should be perceived differently for a time limit
coupon versus a coupon that is available to consumers after a certain time.
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Another future research opportunity is to investigate whether consumers perceive
the post-payment any differently than prepayment. While the monetary value of the
payment may be the same, prepayment and post-payment are conceptually distinct and
may result in different consumption and spending behavior. From the mental accounting
perspective (Prelec and Lowenstein, 1998), the consumption decision of individuals who
prepay will be influenced by the sunk cost effect. Conversely, in the case of postpayment, the consumption decision will be driven by the anticipation of payment in the
future. Existing research shows that thoughts about a future payment decreases the
consumption enjoyment and may assist individuals to regulate their consumption
(Raghubir and Srivastava, 2009). For example, two consumers go to a restaurant that
charges $10 for the valet parking. Both consumers are aware of this cost but the first
customer pays before entering the restaurant, whereas the second person pays after
leaving the restaurant. Based on the rationale provided in this research, the first customer
should yield to temptation, whereas the second one should restrain from temptation.
Future research is needed to examine this proposition.

2.9.4 Limitations. The present research was not without limitations. The first
limitation is the nature of the stimuli. This study similar to most of research in mental
accounting entirely employed scenario-based experiments. It might be argued that the
source of the sunk cost was artificially salient to our subjects as compared to the real
world. While the purpose of our study was to show the sunk cost effect of prepayment
with overspending and indulgent consumption, future research should attempt to replicate
our findings with a field study to ensure their generalizability. The second limitation is
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the nature of our sample. Our study employed student subjects, and to that extent, caution
needs to be exercised in extrapolating our results to the general consumer. Finally, we did
not consider whether time and effort were confounded in the effort manipulation for the
second experiment. Effort was manipulated by asking people to imagine that they walk
eight blocks to get their ID from their car. However, making this effort takes time too.
We understand that this is not an easy issue to address and it applies to all types of effort
manipulations in the literature (Kivetz, 2005; Monga and Saini, 2009).
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Appendices

Appendix A: Extra Tables

Table A1: Proportion of budget allocated to debt with the smaller balance under different
APR levels and budget limits

Measure

Proportion of budget allocated
to the smaller balance

Smaller balance APR:
12%

Smaller balance APR:
18%

$200

$400

$600

$200

$400

$600

.85a

.85a

.87a

.32b

.75a

.78a

Significant differences at p<.05 among conditions are shown with dissimilar superscripts,
a and b. Similar superscripts are insignificant at p>.05.
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Table A2: Pretest results for vehicle package evaluation
Measures

Luxury package

Technology package

Hedonism

3.18 a

-1.52 b

Importance

5.11 a

5.46 a

Attractiveness

4.82 a

5.30 a

Significant differences at p<.05 among conditions are shown with dissimilar superscripts,
a and b. Similar superscripts are insignificant at p>.05.
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Table A3: Proportion of budget allocated to the smaller balance when the nature and the
timing of debt vary
Hedonic debt
Measure

Proportion of budget
allocated to the
smaller balance

Utilitarian debt

Past
consumption

Future
consumption

Past
consumption

Future
consumption

.77

.59*

.54*

.73

Values shown by an asterisk are insignificant at p>.05.
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Table A4: Proportion of budget allocated to debt with the smaller balance under different
types of income and number of credit cards

Measure

Proportion of
budget allocated
to the smaller
balance

# credit cards:

# credit cards:

two

five

Type of
income:

Type of
income:

Type of
income:

Type of
income:

Type of
income:

Type of
income:

savings

windfall

rewardbased

savings

windfall

rewardbased

.60c

.77b

.76b

.38a

.43a

.43a

Significant differences at p<.05 among conditions are shown with dissimilar superscripts,
a, b, and c. Similar superscripts are insignificant at p>.05.
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Table A5: Pretest results for snack choices
raisins
Preference
(1=I don’t like it at all and
7=I like it a lot)
Healthiness (1=very
unhealthy and 7=very
healthy)
Estimated price

cheerios

yogurt

5.26 a

4.65 b

6.20 a

4.82 b

6.03 a

3.02 c

5.35 b

6.01 a

$2.63 a

$2.55 a

$2.21 a

$2.44 a

$2.07 a

chocolate
bar
Preference
(1=I don’t like it at all and
7=I like it a lot)
Healthiness (1=very
unhealthy and 7=very
healthy)
Estimated price

Healthy snacks
baby
granola bar
carrots
4.28 b
5.14 a

celery
sticks
2.11 c

rice cake

apple

3.17 c

5.83 a

5.04 b

2.66 c

6.44 a

$2.18 a

$2.26 a

$2.14 a

Oreos

fruit roll-ups

Unhealthy snacks
ice cream
doughnuts

cheese
curls

Doritos
chips

6.25 a

Chips
Ahoy
cookies
4.41 b

3.82 b

5.73 a

5.89 a

4.22 b

4.08 b

3.29 b

2.44 a

2.46 a

2.62 a

2.71 a

2.52 a

2.45 a

2.66 a

3.26 a

$2.68 a

$3.15 a

$2.96 a

$3.19 a

$2.92 a

$3.12 a

$2.88 a

$3.18 a

Significant differences at p<.05 among conditions are shown with dissimilar superscripts, a, b, and c. Similar superscripts are
insignificant at p>.05.
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Table A6: Average amount of money people are willing to pay for their snack based on
the existence of prepayment and consumption avoidance goal
No prepayment
Measure

Average amount of
money people are
willing to pay for their
snack

Prepayment

Avoidance
goal: absent

Avoidance
goal: present

Avoidance
goal: absent

Avoidance
goal: present

$2.93*

$3.96*

$5.06

$3.40*

Values shown by an asterisk are insignificant at p>.05.
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Table A7: Proportion of unhealthy snacks based on the existence of prepayment and
consumption avoidance goal
No prepayment
Measure

Proportion of
unhealthy snacks

Prepayment

Avoidance
goal: absent

Avoidance
goal: present

Avoidance
goal: absent

Avoidance
goal: present

41.90%*

48.30%*

85.20%

36.40%*

Values shown by an asterisk are insignificant at p>.05.
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Table A8: Proportion of health-related, sunk cost-related and pleasure-related across the
prepayment and avoidance goal conditions
No prepayment

Prepayment

.37 a

.26 a

(n=13)

(n=9)

.46 a

.83 b

Avoidance goal: present

(n=17)

(n=30)

Avoidance goal: absent

.34 a

.83 b

(n=12)

(n=29)

.26 a

.32 a

(n=9)

(n=11)

.26 a

.31 a

(n=9)

(n=11)

.14 a

.11 a

(n=5)

(n=4)

Avoidance goal: absent
Proportion of
health-related
thoughts

Proportion of
sunk cost-related
thoughts

Avoidance goal: present

Avoidance goal: absent
Proportion of
pleasure-related
thoughts

Avoidance goal: present

1: Significant differences at p<.05 among conditions are shown with dissimilar
superscripts, a, and b. Similar superscripts are insignificant at p>.05.
2: the number in parentheses represents the number of thoughts in each condition.
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Table A9: Proportion of unhealthy appetizers under anticipation and different types of
prepayment
Unanticipated prepayment

Anticipated prepayment

currency:

currency:

currency:

currency:

currency:

currency:

Money

Time

Effort

Money

Time

Effort

34.50%c

57.70%a

59.30%a

75.90%b

57.10%a

51.70%a

Measure
Proportion
of
unhealthy
appetizers

Significant differences at p<.05 among conditions are shown with dissimilar superscripts,
a, b, and c. Similar superscripts are insignificant at p>.05.
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4.2 Appendix B: Scales/Measures

A) Overall knowledge of credit card terms: participants rated the following
attributes on a 7-point semantic scale (1=one of the least knowledgeable and
7=one of the most knowledgeable).
•

Annual percentage rate (APR)

•

Minimum balance

•

Payment due date

•

Credit card limit

•

Outstanding balance

B) Task involvement: participants rated their level of involvement with the credit
card scenario by responding to the following items:
•

When I was reading the scenario: (1=I was not at all involved and 7=very
involved)

•

When I was reading the scenario: (1=I was not at all interested and 7=very
interested)

•

When I was reading the scenario: (1=I was not at all involved and 7=very
involved)

•

When I was reading the scenario: (1=I skimmed the information quickly
and 7= I read the information carefully)

•

When I was reading the scenario: (1=I paid little attention and 7= I paid a
lot of attention)

C) Hedonism: participant considered upgrading their vehicle with two possible
packages, luxury and technology, for $1800. The luxury package included leather
seats, seat warmers, and panoramic sunroof, while the technology package offered
in-dash GPS, Tiptronic transmission, and an advanced suspension system.
Participants rated each package separately based on the following items:
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• (1=not functional and 7=functional)
• (1= unnecessary and 7= necessary)
• (1= impractical and 7= practical)
• (1= ineffective and 7= effective)
• (1= unhelpful and 7= helpful)
• (1= fun and 7= not fun)
• (1= exciting and 7= dull)
• (1= delightful and 7= not delightful)
• (1= thrilling and 7= not thrilling)
• (1= enjoyable and 7= unenjoyable)

D) Individuals’ motivation to reduce the number of debt accounts: all items are
measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree and 7=very strongly
agree).
•

If I receive a transfer balance offer from a bank, I take advantage of it to
aggregate my debts into one account.

•

My total debt appears to be bigger when I own multiple credit cards than
when I own only one.

•

I think I make the most progress toward debt payment when I pay off my
credit card debt one at a time.

•

The nagging thoughts about debt payment come to my mind more
frequently when I have multiple credit cards than when I have only one
credit card.

•

For any given debt, I’d rather to carry the balance on one credit card
instead of multiple credit cards.

E) Healthy eating habits: participants rated their eating habits by responding to the
following items:
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•

I watch what I eat: (1= completely disagree and 7= completely agree)

•

Eating healthy for me: (1= is not at all important and 7= very important)

•

I am: (1= not on a diet and 7= on a diet)

•

I eat: (1= less of fruits/veggies and 7= more of fruits/veggies)

•

I try to choose low-calorie foods: (1= completely disagree and 7=
completely agree)

F) Instructions for coding participants thoughts: please read the written responses
carefully and categorize each participant’s response(s) to one (or more) of the
following categories.
•

Health-related thoughts: the responses mainly focus on the health
benefits associated with consumption. Participants may discuss their
healthy eating habits and express their desire to select healthy (e.g., low
carb, low calories) snack choices.

•

Sunk cost-related thoughts: participants account for the time, effort, or
money spent in the food festival. Participants are aware of the monetary
and non-monetary costs associated with their consumption decision.

•

Pleasure-related thoughts: the responses mainly focus on the pleasure
and satisfaction derived from food consumption. Participants may describe
their passion for and express their feelings toward a certain kind of snack.
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